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I. INTBODDCTION
Cracks are showing in the Soviet empire. It is costing
the Soviets more and more money and political concessions to
maintain the united front they like their Eastern European
allies to present to the world. Control of Eastern Europe
has been a major concern for the Soviet Union since World
War II for several reasons:
1. The military, security factor. Eastern Europe has
served as a L~uTfer zone againsE possible attack from the
West.
2. The s£cing_board factor. Eastern Europe has served
as a base for possible military aggression against or
the assertion of political influence over Western
Europe.
3* The Communist internationalist factor. The Soviets
have seen Eastern "Europe in expansionist ideological
terms, as a vanguard of Communist states forwarding the
process of world revolution.
4. The ideological security factor. Eastern Europe has
provided a derensive Soviet leadership with an ideolo-
gical buffer zone in its efforts to secure its own
closed system of government against the dangers of
outside ideological and political penetration [Hef. 1 ].
In view of the extremely divisive factors operating among
the Eastern bloc nations (.e.g, ethnic rivalries, resentment
against the Soviet Union, historically conflicting land
claims, poor economic performance, etc.), just how reliable
the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) would be
in case of a war with NATO is a question Western analysts
are studying.
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the political
and military reliability of the "Northern tier"
stat es--Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, and
Poland--as Soviet allies in case of a war with NATO. Since
the term "reliability" is applied differently by different
authors, the following definition offered by Dale Herspring
and Ivan Volgyes will be used:
"Political reliability" includes "the conviction b^ the
political leadership (both Soviet and national Communist
Parties) that the armed forces will carry out instruc-
tions given to them" as well as "the willingness of
significant segments of the armed forces to carry out
these orders, either because they have a normative
commitment to the regime or because they feel it is in
their interest to do so [Ref. 2 J.
To this definition the following must be added:
Political reliability also involves the conviction of
the Soviet leadership that the various Communist Parties
will be able to maintain internal control and external
loyalty to the Soviet Union, and will, in fact- take the
appropriate steps necessary tc ensure that control.
In addition the following portions of the Herspring and
Volgyes' typology to categorize the reliability of the armed
forces will be used:
External-offensive
:
The willingness of the military to support the regime in
offensive campaigns against otner countries [Ref- 3].
External-defensive
The probability that the armed forces will defend the
state against external threats [Ref. 4 ].
This thesis will be primarily concerned with the external-
offensive category, posing the scenario of a war with NATO,
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as opposed to attacks on other WTO coantries, neutral coun-
tries, or the Soviet Union, although some comments will be
made on the external-defensive category. (For example, what
would happen if Western forces attacked an Eastern bloc
country which was not part cf an original Warsaw Pact
assault against NATO?)
In order to evaluate the reliability of the Northern
tier states as Soviet allies, it is necessary to examine the
following aspects:
1. The domestic political and economic situation
2. The bilateral relationship between the states and the
Soviet Union
3. The multilateral relationships within the WTO and
COMECON
These will be discussed for each state in the following
format:
1. Development of political culture: History prior to
World War II
The government: Relations with the people and the
Soviet Union
The military: Relations with the government, the
people, and the Soviet Union




tions serve as a means of controlling their members
and the extent of Northern Tier participation.
To effectively control its satellite states, the Soviet
Union must control three key areas: political developments,
the military, and the economy. They have imposed the
Russian system of operation on all their allies, regardless
of whether it is suitable or not. In order to provide a
1 1
basis for comparison, the following sections will examine
the Russian political culture and general aspects of the
organizations the Soviets set up to control the militaries
and the economies of their allies.
A. RUSSIAI POLITICAL COLTUHE
One of the primary factors causing friction between the
Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies is the fact
that the institutions that the Soviets use to control these
countries were designed to accommodate the Russian percep-
tions of the character of man and the realities of the
world. The fact that these perceptions differ radically
from the democratic, individualistic, independent political
traditions of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland makes
the Soviet institutions fit uneasily over these societies.
The people of each country have rejected the Russian view of
the world and the Soviet systems at some time during the
post-World War II period, causing the national communist
governments to have to maintain their control by force.
This will probably undermine their reliability as Soviet
allies in times of crises with the West.
The following discussion will highlight tha Russian view
of the world and the reasons for its development. This will
be contrasted later to Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish
traditions to illustrate the reasons for friction and poten-
tial unreliability.
The key to the original Russian culture was survival.
The people existed in extreme poverty for centuries in the
dense forests of far northern Europe. They had nothing to
trade except that which came from the forest. One season in
seven was an agricultural disaster; and the people were
surrounded on all sides by enemies. But they survived and
expanded into the east and into Siberia. The smallest
12
surv.ivable unit was the village. The meaning of an
individual's life was defined in terms of the welfare of the
village. Man was considered to be "bad" and had to be
controlled or he would become a threat not only to himself
but also to his village.
The political system consisted of a village council from
which one elder emerged as a spokesperson. He was not
necessarily the most powerful, tut was always the connection
to the outside world. Free discussion was allowed within
the council until a decision was made. After that, all
unanimously supported the decision. Conspiracy and secrecy
were basic ingredients of the system. Power (authority) did
not flow "up" from the people, rather "down" from the
elders. The men were brutal, authoritarian, suspicious, and
paranoid about the intentions of the outside world--
characterist ics still much in evidence today.
As the Russian Slavs moved into the area of Moscow, the
village system developed into one in which the most powerful
elders resided at Moscow and the most powerful of those
(usually the one owning the most land) became the Grand
Prince. He was the center of the Russian system and all
power radiated from him. The pcwer of the other princes was
contingent upon their relationship to the Grand Prince.
Their titles meant nothing, as far as being an indication of
their real authority. The parallel to today's Soviet lead-
ership is striking.
Since the Russians believe that man is bad and must be
controlled for his own good, they set up their political
institutions to do just that. The Bolsheviks of 1917 added
siege mentality to the system. Since they constantly
expected to be attacked and overthrown by "capitalist"
forces, they trusted no one, not even those who professed to
be allies or friends. The only way they felt secure was if
their exact system, headed by their own people, or
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"reliable" nationals (usually someone who could be
controlled by blackmail) , was in place. That there is no
room for individuality, nationalism, or democracy in this
system is the primary reason for its lack of easy adapt-
ability to countries with those traditions.
The Soviets have not ever, however, relief upon adapt-
ability, preferring instead force and substantial dependence
on the Soviet Union- Two of the organizations used to
ensure the latter two conditions are the Warsaw Treaty
Organization (WTO) and the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (COMECON) .
E. THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION (MTO)
The WTO came into existence on 14 May 1955, ostensibly as a
reaction to the newly-established NATO. 1 From 1955 to 1960
the organization was relatively dormant. (See Figure 1.1
for the structure.) The political and military organs met
only once or twice and there was only one major exercise.
However, during that time considerable effort was spent in
improving the quality of the manpower and armaments of the
various member armies [fief. 5].
Beginning in 1961 major exercises involving several or
all of the member states began occurring frequently. It is
Christopher Jones' theory that the WTO maneuvers serve as a
basis for periodic reentry of Soviet troops into those coun-
tries which do not have them permanently stationed there, as
well as being a device to prevent organization members from
1 Romania is an anomaly within the Warsaw Pact, and much
of the following discussion of Fact functions and operations
does not apply. Romania has no Russian troops stationed on
its soil, allows no Pact exercises to be conducted within
its territory, conducts a relatively independent foreign
policy—sometimes openly breaking with the Soviet Union; and
yet it insists on maintaining top level representation on
warsaw Pact and COMECON councils where all members are
allowed representatives, and it will participate in command
post military exercises.
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developing their own territorial defense [ Eef . 6 ]-
Figure 1.1, outlining the structure of the Warsaw Pact,
certainly seems to support the contention that exercises are
the main peacetime function of the organization. The
national armies do not take day-to-day orders from the
Council of Defense Ministers ncr from the Military Council
through the Inspectorate or Military Missions, although no
doubt there are inputs to national military decisions from
the latter in the countries where Soviet troops are
stationed.
In order to keep the states from deploying their own
system (a la Romania or Yugoslavia), the Warsaw Pact exer-
cises try to limit the amount of time that national forces
of a member nation work together as a unit unier the control
of a native commander. The units are always made up of
members from at least two and sometimes more countries; thus
it is not easy for national commanders to judge how their
troops would function on their cwn, nor to develop their own
defense plans, nor to practice such plans.
There was a common pattern in the staging of the exer-
cises. Approximately one-third on home territory, one-third
on foreign territory, and one-third jointly on home and
foreign territory. The same pattern occurred in the assign-
ment of exercise commanders. One-third of the time national
armed forces were commanded by their own officers and two-
thirds of the time they were commanded by foreign officers
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Theoretically the Combined Supreme Command of the WTO
controls only the following forces in peacetime:
1. Group of Soviet Forces Germany
2. Northern Group of Forces (Poland)
3. Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia)
4. Southern Group of Forces (Hungary)
5. All forces of the National People's Army (NVA) of the
German Democratic Republic.
However Soviet influence predominates in the following areas
(not applicable to Romania) :
1. The Combined Supreme Command and staff of the
combined armed forces.
2. The Defense Ministers of the smaller Pact nations in
their dual capacity as Deputy Supreme Commanders of
the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces and supreme commanders
of their respective national forces.
3. The Soviet military missions in member nations.
4. The representative of the Combined Supreme Command in
each member nation. These Soviet generals have a
complete staff, which enables them to function as a
guardian organ.
5. The Soviet advisors, who are present in varying
numbers and duty positions within the armies of the
Pact nations.
6. The Communist Party, to which a large percentage of
the officers and NCOs of all Pact armies belong.
7. The state security forces whose power extends even
into the armed forces.
3. The many Russian wives of service members of Pact
nations. [Ref. 8].
In addition to those factors, the WTO area has an exten-
sively integrated air defense network, of which the Supreme
Commander is always a Soviet General. Also the High Command
of the Baltic Fleet in Leningrad would control the Polish
and GDR Navies.
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The Chief of Staff of the WTO is always a Soviet General
(chosen by "mutual agreement" of "unspecified electors"
rather than by the Political Consultative Committee or the
Council of Defense Ministers) £Ref. 9], and the exercise
scenarios are developed by the WTO staff, which is multina-
tional in composition- There is no indication that national
general staffs are given the exclusive responsibility for
preparation or conduct of joint exercises at any level
[Ref. 10].
Two other ways the Soviets have of influencing the WTO
armed forces are through the direction of the training that
each force receives and a substantial say in tne advancement
of their officers to the higher levels of command. The way
the Soviets have acquired control over the training of the
armies is to require the members states to structure their
programs to meet the requirements of the joint WTO exer-
cises, which as indicated earlier, are also dasigned prima-
rily by the Soviets. At yearly joint meetings of the WTO
Military Council and the officers from the member states,
the results of the previous year's exercises are reviewed
and the schedule and requirements for the next year are set.
The decisions of the Military Council are officially only
"recommendations," but generally the member states, with the
exception of Romania, abide by them. Since tha adoption of
the recommendations is not mandatory, the commander of the
WTO does not rely exclusively en the 3ast European military
leaders to carry out the approved training. The group of
senior Soviet officers who serve as "liaisons" to the armed
forces of each member state "supervise" the compliance with
these decisions. [Ref. 11].
The WTO exercises also provide the Soviets with a chance
to evaluate the performance of the East European officers
that participate in them. It is highly likely that the
Soviets use these evaluations and access to the mid-level
19
and higher training in the Soviet military academies as a
means to ensure that ths national ministries will only
promote those officers who have demonstrated loyalty to the
Soviet Union and its doctrine [ Bef . 12]- The Soviets main-
tain a series of mid-career academies that offer highly
specialized degrees that are not obtainable in Eastern
Europe, and the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow
is the only academy guaiified to teach strategic doctrine to
senior WTO officers. Its graduates hold a virtual monopoly
on the posts of defense ministers, chiefs of staff, and
chiefs of main political administrations. There is some
evidence to suggest that Eastern European officers are most
likely to gain admission to Voroshilov if they already have
at least one Soviet degree. It also suggests that only
graduates of this school are given command and staff respon-
sibilities in the administration of multinational forces in
the joint WTO exercises [Ref- 13]- (Again, Romania is the
exception. If there is a command and staff position that
allows for rotation of control between the various Pact
members, Romania will certainly insist on its turn. The
person who is then selected to fill that position will be
chosen by Romania, not the Soviet Union, and it is not
likely that he will have been educated in the Soviet mili-
tary schools.)
C. COUHCIL FOB MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (COMECON)
COMECON was another of Stalin's ploys to iceep the West
from gaining a foothold in Eastern European countries which
fell under his influence. When Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland indicated a desire to participate in the Marshal Plan
in 1949, Stalin realized some form of economic assistance
would have to be made available in addition to military and
political coercion. There is some indication, however, that
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Stalin himself nipped any real economic integration in the
bud by not explicitly entrusting a specific body within the
organization with coordination of this effort. He appar-
ently feared that a healthy, cooperative Eastern European
bloc might turn into an anti-Soviet bloc. [Ref. 14]
The official goals of COMECON were vague: "exchanging
economic experience, extending technical aid to one another,
and rendering mutual assistance with respect to raw
materials, foodstuffs, machines, equipment, etc."
[fief, 15 ] # but with no specific body to guide and enforce
these goals, not much was accomplished during the first
fifteen years of its existence. Leonid Brezhnev attempted
further integration of the COMECON economies in 1971 when he
unveiled, with great fanfare, the Comprehensive Program for
Socialist Integration— an attempt to substitute joint plan-
ning of key sectors for the politically unattainable supra-
national planning [fief. 16]. In 1975, the members adopted
the "Concerted Plan of Multilateral Integrations Measures"
to implement the Comprehensive Program. This program has
very specific targets in five broad categories:
1. Material, financial, and in some cases, labor trans-
fers for the joint projects started in the mid-1970s.
This part of the plan represents anout 9 million
convertible rubles, most of which would be spent in
the Soviet Union.
2. Multilateral specialization and cooperation agree-
ments in the engineering and chemical sectors (e.g.
computer technology, herbicides, container transport,
atomic power stations, private cars, etc.).
3. Scientific and technological cooperation projects to
improve and expand new sources of energy, fuels, and
essential raw materials.
4. Measures to enhance the development of Mongolia.
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5. Consequences of the common actions vis-a-vis third
countries. [Ref. 17]
In spite of the fact that these targets were an integral
part of the 1976-80 plans with the force of laws in partici-
pating countries, available evidence suggests that only
limited progress has been made in internationalizing their
economies and molding the region into a coherent, interde-
pendent market [Ref. 18 J- A sharp downturn in the Eastern
European economies which began in 1978 for Poland and
Hungary, 1979 in Czechoslovakia, and in 1982 for tne GDR,
forced delays in seme projects caused by bottlenecks in
production in one country which then affected production in
other countries. [Bef. 19] These economic problems have
increased the willingness of the COMECON countries to rely
on each other more, thus binding them ever more closely to
the Soviet Union.
Having presented the basics of the Soviet institutions
for control of political, military, and economic develop-
ments in its satellite countries, the following three chap-
ters will look at the results of the imposition of these
institutions on Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic
Republic, and Poland. The potential for unreliability will
become apparent as the discussion progresses.
2 That as, these requirements were suppose! to have legal




A. CZECHOSLOVAK POLITICAL CULTURE
The state of Czechoslovakia came into being on 28
October 1918 as a result of the unconditional surrender of
Austria in World War I and the subsequent breakup of the
Austro-Hungarian empire. It included several
nationalities--Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Hungarians, and
Ruthenians— of which the Czechs and Slovaks comprised some
65%. A brief look at the history of the area prior to
unification is necessary to understand the tensions that are
present in the modern state.
Slovakia and the Czech lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and
southeastern Silesia are of great strategic importance
because they lie at the heart of Europe. Historically these
lands have been the crossroads of the cultures of East and
West. Because of their great agricultural, mineral, and
commercial wealth, they were often subjected to foreign
invasion and conquest [fief. 20]. The Great Moravian Empire
was established in the latter half of the ceatury as the
Slovonic tribes in the Danube area united to fight the ever
present German threat, but this unity did not last very
long, as the Czechs seceded from the empire in 895, prefer-
ring the rule of the Germans [Ref. 21]. From the late elev-
enth century forward, the Czechs and Slovaks have maintained
a distinctly Western political, social, and cultural orien-
tation [Bef. 22], however until 1950 they also exhibited a
sentimental admiration for Russian Slavs (in marked contrast
to the Poles)
,
probably because they had not engaged the
Russians in direct conflict.
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The fifteenth century saw the inception of another very
important force in the cultural development of the
Czechs—Hussitism. John Hus, a Protestant reformer, tried
to fight the abuses of the Catholic Church by stressing
equality, tolerance, reason, and individualism. These qual-
ities were to have a significant impact on the future state
of Czechoslovakia. The Hussite movement also helped stimu-
late a national consciousness by encouraging the use of the
Czech language in churches, schools, and in public life.
Later, during the early nineteenth century the Czechs and
Slovaks experienced a revival of that national consciousness
which had been badly damaged by the terribly destructive
Thirty Years' war (1618-1648). They also began to actively
advocate cooperation between all Slavs (including Fussians)
in cultural, commercial, and political matters. Most impor-
tantly, however, for future relations with the Soviet Union,
they continued to think of themselves first as Czechs and
Slovaks, and secondly as Slavs.
The revolutions of 1843 caused the Habsburg emperor,
Francis Joseph, to emancipate all the peasants in the
Austro-Hungarian empire and introduce a system of central-
ized imperial administration. By the 1860s, a limited
introduction of civil liberties and self-government were
allowed; and by the turn of the century, rapid industriali-
zation and urbanization had produced a large Czech middle
and working class, but the Slovaks remained largely a
peasant society well into the twentieth century due to the
repressive, authoritarian, and still semi-feuiai Hungarian
government. [ Eef . 23]
After World War 1, the Czech and Slovak territories were
urited into the independent state of Czechoslovakia. The
new state possessed considerable economic resources and a
fairly even balance between those engaged in agriculture,
industry, and services, and a pro-Western, democratic vision
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of the future. In structuring their new government, the
negative experiences the people had had with absolute
monarchs led them to place the ultimate source of state
power in a strong parliament.
The most decisive factor in Czechoslovak politics was
the political parties, which cumbered approximately thirty
and represented every facet of the ethnic, social, economic,
and religious aspects of the population. Only a dozen or so
parties obtained enough votes to be represented in the
parliament and none were strong enough to rule alone.
Fortunately for the country, the governing coalitions were
made up of moderate parties and responsible leaders, who were
willing to search for a workable compromise to their many
problems.
The most serious of these problems resulted from the
social and economic divisions inherited from the
Austro-Hungarian empire. In 1919, the desperate peasants
and workers, sometimes influenced by Bolshevik propaganda,
took matters in their own hands. The government was able to
contain a possible revolution by responding to the need for
radical social and economic reforms. The Constitution of
1920 guaranteed its citizens the customary rights of Western
democracies, but added some new ones— "the right to work and
social insurance, .. .women 1 s suffrage, protection of
marriage, motherhood, and f amiiy, ... granted the national
minorities equality with the Czechs and Slovaks, and guaran-
teed free development of their cultural institu-
tions... (with) public support for them." [Ref. 24] Thus,
Western democratic traditions were firmly rooted in the
state of Czechoslovakia from its inception.
When the political leaders realized in 1938 that Hitler
fully intended to inflict upcn the young state another
period of absolute subjugation to German authority, it seems
somewhat surprising that President Eduard Banes and the
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Czechoslovak citizens did not resist more strongly the
dismemberment of their country. For centuries the way of
the Czechs and Slovaks had been to mediate between East and
West, being located right at the crossroads of the two
cultures. They felt that if they had to fight to solve
every problem, soon there would be nothing left to fight
for. Thus they opted for negotiation whenever possible
[fief. 25]. Benes apparently could not face being respon-
sible for the physical obliteration of his people in a
confrontation with the Germans, and he capitulated to
Hitler's demands without calling upon the people to resist-
He must have reasoned that, as they had many times in the
past, so once again would they survive 'in spite of a new
round of foreign occupation.
B. THE GOVEBNMENT
In 1945 Czechoslovakia was "liberated" by the Soviet
Union. In the eyes of many Czechoslovakians, devastated by
the betrayal by France and Great Britain before the war and
not understanding the American decision at the end of the
war to let the Soviet Onion "literate" Prague, communism and
the Soviet Union represented the only guarantee of the
safety of their state against a resurgent German threat.
Benes returned from exile via Moscow feeling relatively sure
that Stalin would honor his wartime promise not to try to
communize Czechoslovakia by force. He did not feel that
Stalin would risk Russia's newly gained world power status
by inviting condemnation of the international community for
the invasion or subversion of another state.
These feelings showed how Western-oriented the
Czechoslovakians really were and how little they actually
understood of the motivations and fears of the
Soviet/Russian culture. The Czech way had been negotiation
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and survival in spite of foreign control. The Russian way
was to build up military security and gain absolute control
of neighboring countries to form a buffer zone to prevent a
foreign take-over. The Czechs could not know that the
Soviet regime felt itself completely surrounded by enemies
and that it would not feel safe until the whole world was
made up of socialist governments controlled by the Soviet
Union. If a government could cot be controlled, there was
always the possibility that at some point it would turn
against them. All the Czechs saw was a geographical situ-
ation that put them between Germany on one side and the
Soviet Union on the other. The Czechs were as terrified of
a rearmed Germany as the Soviets were, but they obviously
could not depend upon the Western governments (France,
Britain, and the United States) to guarantee their safety.
The Soviet Union offered military protection and an ideology
that promised a chance for true democratic development and
advancement for the "little guy."
Because many Czech intellectuals felt betrayed by the
Western Allies, and because they truly believed that Marxism
was the way of the future, they collaborated with the
Soviets in 1945. By 1948 the Communists had gained suffi-
cient power to set up a take-over of the government when the
Ministers of three democratic parties resigned from the
parliament in an attempt to force new elections. For a week
President Benes resisted the pressure to accept their resig-
nations and appoint Communist-approved replacements. He
finally gave in for much the same reasons that he capitu-
lated in 1938: he saw it as the only alternative to a
bloody civil war and direct or indirect Soviet intervention
to assure the victory of the Communists. [Ref. 26]
By 1968, most of the Czechoslovakian intellectuals and
workers who had supported the Communist takeover in 1948
were disillusioned and bitter.
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Twenty years ago. when we were twenty, we jumped head
first into politics, as though we were jumping into
uncharted waters. . .and we were duly rude and inconsid-
erate about the hesitation and lack of understanding of
these motives sensitively enough.... A little later, the
people who had led us into the struggle left the stage,
those with whose names we had linked our successes.
This was bad enough in itself. but the real shock came
only when we found out that they had been very far from
infallible. [ Bef . 27]
The statement that the Czechoslovakians thought they were
Slavs and found out that they were Westerners is an appro-
priate description of the times.
Understanding the "Prague Spring" and the events that
led up to it are crucial to any estimation of current Czech
reliability; therefore, this period will be examined in some
detail.
The Communist Party leadership in Czechoslovakia deftly
managed to hold off any liberalization of the system after
Stalin's death in 1953 until the early sixties. If it were
not for the serious area-wide (i.e. Eastern European)
economic difficulties, they might have been able to delay it
even longer. Almost none of the target figures of the
economic plan was reached in 1961, and an acute shortage of
commodities of all kinds, reminiscent of the fifties, made
it apparent to most leading communists that the Stalinist
economic model had outlived its usefulness (if indeed it
ever really helped Czechoslovakia) . As it was impossible to
criticize Stalin's economic model without criticizing his
political model also, opposition arose quickly to the
dogmatic line in politics, culture, and justice. These
opponents received considerable support from the new genera-
tion of Party elites, who had no connection with (and thus
no responsibility for) the excesses of the Stalin era. Thus
the liberalization drive began to gain momentum. [fief. 28]
28
The official signal for "destalinizat ion" was given at
the Twelfth Congress of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party
(CPCS) in December, 1962. As a result several incumbent
Party members lost their positions for having been judged
responsible for these miscarriages of justice. Among
leaders of long standing, only the First Secretary Antonin
Novotny was able to keep his functions. The reinstatement
of the falsely accused leaders of the fifties proceeded
unevenly, and the Slovak Party members became particularly
bitter, not only about the refusal to reinstate their
leaders (which would have proved extremely embarrassing to
Novotny who was responsible for many of their ousters) , but
also because the Prague Secretariat continued to ignore the
ethnic demands of the Slovak people. This proved to be a
serious concern for the leadership of the CPCS in succeeding
years. After the Twelfth Party Congress, criticism in the
press, particularly in cultural and literary reviews, became
loud and daring.
Despite all attempts by the regime to curb the criti-
cism, the movement could not be contained, and it eventually
led to a wave of liberalization unprecedented in the history
of the communist party-state system. It began in January
1968 with the dismissal of Novotny as First Secretary and
the transfer of his power to Alexander Dubcek. The diffi-
culty in containing the revisionism in Czech thought stemmed
from the fact that the intellectuals expressed the general
opinion of all the elites in the society— economists, indus-
trial managers, scientists—as well as that of the noncommu-
nist population.
The intellectuals became the focal point of the opposi-
tion because they were very skillful in formulating their
ideas and had access to the mass media which would publicize
them. A statement from Karel Kosik, a renowned Czech
philosopher illustrates the concerns that swept throughout
the country in 1967-68:
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The root of our political crisis lies in the fact that
the citizens of this country no longer want to live as
party or non-party masses, without full rights or
without any rights at all. ...the difference between the
two systems (i.e. totalitarianism and socialist democ-
racy) is a fundamental one. Cne is based on the partial
or total lack of rights of the party and non-party
masses, the other on the equality ana full rights of all
socialist citizens. [Ref. 29]
Dubcek and his supporters pushed for reforms that would
bring more productivity and efficiency to the country, and
tried to truly legitimize rule of the Czechoslovak Communist
Party; but they also had to deal with the threat of Soviet
interference if their reforms went too far. The majority of
the people supported continuation of a "socialist" society,
(see Figure A. 1 in Appendix A) but their idea of socialism
was the pre-communist system allowing genuine debate and
participation of political parties other than the Communist
Party. (See Figure A. 2 in Appendix A) Ever mindful of what
had happened to Hungary in 1956, the Dubcek government
sought to assure the Soviet leadership that they had no
plans to deviate from supporting Soviet positions foreign
policy matters nor to withdraw from the Warsaw Treaty
Organization. Dubcek totally misunderstood the threat that
a truly popularly- supported ruling Communist Party with
freedom of expression would pose for the Soviet Union and
other Eastern European regimes. Popular support would erode
the Party's absolute control, and freedom to discuss and
question domestic aspects would ultimately leal to a reval-
uation of foreign policy, no matter how much the leadership
vowed it would not. These were certainly two key elements
in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet invasion in August of 1968 stopped all
reforms in mid-step. "Normalization" (the acquiring of
legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party after the reimposi-
tion of absolute control) has net proceeded well. With the
invasion, the Soviet Onion destroyed the willing support of
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the one true friend they had in Eastern Europe.
Czechoslovakia would have voluntarily chosen communism had
it been allowed to develop it its own way
—
precisely what
the Soviets could not allow. While Gustav Husak and the
current party leadership have succeeded to a degree in
providing a prosperous economy and material comforts for the
people, they have not succeeded to this day in winning their
loyalty.
The Soviets did not realize the true extent of support
that existed in the country for Dubcek and the proposed
reforms before their invasion. Their intelligence network
had been effectively cut off, and there are indications that
at the time of the invasion they were relying on the infor-
mation of the hardliners who had been down-playing the
amount of support for the reforms, and were, supposedly,
preparing a "request for fraternal assistance." The fact
that it took the Soviets seven months to replace Alexander
Dubcek with Husak shows that, net finding any way to legally
justify their actions, they did not wish to further exacer-
bate the situation. Figures A. 3 and A. 4 (see Appendix A)
show the extent of support enjoyed by Dubcek during that
period.
When Husak did finally take over on 17 April 1969, the
speed with which he began to purge the party and the govern-
ment shocked his supporters. Other drastic actions that he
took, such as media control, convinced them that there was
no chance for compromise. They then realized that the
liberalization would not be allowed to continue in any form;
yet despite that realization, organized opposition to
Husak's actions appeared on 21 August in the form of a "Ten
Point Manifesto. " This document rejected Soviet military
intervention, threats of purges, censorship, "normaliza-
tion," etc. It expressed support for human rights, demo-
cratic elections, and the eight of citizens to disagree with
their government. [ Bef . 30]
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Once it became clear that opposition to the party would
not be tolerated, the great majority of the population
relapsed into a convenient apolitical mode. In spite of
widespread grumbling and anger over inefficient production,
corruption and incompetence of the newly imposed managers,
there was no sign of a boiling point being reached. While
they viewed the government as unfriendly, the relative
success of the economy during the normalization years
removed the lack of consumer gocds as a point of contention.
Since it was obvious that they were not to be allowed to
have any influence over the workings of the system, the
majority reverted to being most concerned about how to make
their individual lives better.
On 28 October 1970, the day marking the 52nd anniversary
of the foundation of the independent Czechoslo vakian state
in 19 18, the "Socialist Movement of Czechoslovak Citizens"
issued its first manifesto. The authors asked the citizens
not to close themselves off from their fellow citizens nor
to become victims of cynicism and apathy. In December 1971
and January 1972 some 200 people were arrested and during
the following summer ten political trials were held. The
fact that the Movement was not able to mobilize opposition
to the trials showed how effectively the mixture of coercion
and material comfort had been in convincing the people not
to support what they felt to be a lost cause. That did not
mean, however, that "normalization" was warking or that
Czechoslovak reliability had increased.
By 1974, the initial economic successes had begun to
wear off and the traditional problems of a centrally planned
economy began to reassert themselves. At the end of the
year a half-hearted attempt was made to "increase effi-
ciency," because of the fear of another round of demands for
liberalization if measures were not taken. The results were
negligible. On the whole, however, since the people were
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still working. (in spite of significantly lower worker
productivity), and goods were still generally available
(even if the quality was not up to international standards
as before) , the demands for reform remained low-keyed. The
regime still had to contend, though, with the underlying
levels of frustration felt by an increasing number of people
who had sufficient savings to buy washing machines, refrig-
erators, cars, and take holidays in Bulgaria. These people
were experiencing the "rising expectations" syndrome. They
wanted automatic washing machines, freezers. Western cars,
and Western holidays, like their counterparts in Western
countries. The danger was still there that if the govern-
ment did not eventually satisfy these desires, the people
would become "political" again. [Ref. 31]
Again in 1S77 it seems that the intellectuals who formu-
lated Charter 77 were trying to harness some of those under-
lying frustrations to produce a new wave of demands, albeit
less strident than in 1968, for the respect of human rights
in Czechoslovakia as affirmed in the Helsinki Accord of
1975. Charter 77 itself was a combination of a statement, a
petition, and a declaration of intent to be delivered to the
government, the Federal Assembly, and the Czechoslovak Press
Agency. These copies were confiscated by tha police prior
to their delivery, but a copy did make it to the Western
press. It was signed by 242 individuals who maintained
their intention was to "discharge their civic duties" in
five ways: by focusing attention on the infringement of
human rights in Czechoslovakia, by documenting such grie-
vances; by suggesting remedies; by making general proposals
to strengthen rights and freedoms and the mechanisms
designed to protect them; and by acting as intermediaries in
situations of conflict. The fact that the authors of the
Charter kept its formulations strictly within the law of the
land so that the regime could not find any pretext for
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interpreting it as illegal has been a sore point for many
years. The core of the Charter is the upholding of all
laws, including international commitments. [Ref. 32]- The
main characteristics of Charter 77 are as follows:
1. No new protests were introduced; it summarized and
generalized those that had been made before.
2. It focused on human rights, one of the key prcbiems
in "normalized" Czechoslovakia, rather than on the
whole gamut of economic, political, and cultural
issues.
3. It neither endorses nor condemns socialism.
4. It questions the right of Party ap_p_arachiks to issue
orders binding on non-party citizens outside and
above the legal framework.
The Charter was signed by people from all walks of life
and all political persuasions, except, of course, loyal
supporters of the incumbent regime. By the eni of 1977, the
number of signatories had risen to over 800. Among the
first 242, intellectuals, most of whom had been victims of
the purges and subsequent discrimination, predominated.
Among the later signatories , three categories of supporters
were noted: workers, young people, and those who had been
only marginally or not at all affected by discrimination.
The widespread anti-Charter campaign showed that the govern-
ment realized that the opposition to the regime was not
dead, and that that sentiment could coalesce at some inop-
portune moment producing again the widespread support for
liberalization that the regime faced in 1968, further exas-
perating the Soviets.
And now, seven years after Charter 77 and fifteen years
after the Soviet invasion, what is the status of relations
between the Communist Party and the people, and the
Communist Party and the Soviet Union? Obviously intellec-
tual opposition is not dead; but with the tight media
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control in Czechoslovakia, it is unlikely that inflammatory
issues filter down to the public at large, which continues
to be more concerned with improving its material condition
than with risking the loss of what it has gained by
pubiically opposing the current regime. However, the
continued existence of what Jane Leftwich Curry calls the
"initiation mode" of media control (x.e. a prepublication
check to ensure the "correctness" of the author's views)
indicates that the Soviets are still not sura that fifteen
years of indoctrination have taken hold. They recognize
that there are still large gaps between what the people
expect and what they actually get, both economically and
politically. [Ref. 33]
As far as relations with the Soviet Union go, since the
normalization began, Czech foreign policy has been totally
subordinated to Soviet foreign aims. From 1969 to 1978,
Vladimir Kusin finds "not a single instance of deviation on
record or even reluctance to perform as expected."
[Eef. 34] Prague was chosen as the host to various interna-
tional conferences from 1970 to 1977 (21 to be exact) at
which the Moscow line was promoted to delegates from commu-
nist parties all over the world. Czechoslovak leaders and
propagandists became the most ardent supporters of proleta-
rian internationalism and the leading critics of
Eurocommunism. [Ref. 35] This slavish conformity notwith-
standing, it is a sure bet that the Soviets do not trust the
people of Czechoslovakia to remain quiescent forever, and
that they will keep a close eye on the ability of the
current leadership to maintain control.
C. THE MILITARY
The armed forces of Czechoslovakia are among the most
modern and technologically advanced in the Warsaw Treaty
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Organization. Czechoslovakia also has an active domestic
arms industry and supplies both other WTO members and
"progressive" Third World countries, and is a key element in
the Soviet security system.
The military has a proud history, dating from the accom-
plishments of the Czechoslovak Legion in World War I whose
reputation certainly influenced the decision to grant the
territory independence from Austria-Hungary. In Forld War
II Czechoslovak soldiers fought bravely as individuals with
the Allies on both fronts. Curiously, though, during the
three crises of the modern state--1938, 1948, 1968— the
military did not lift a finger to protect it. They remained
confined to their barracks during the confrontations.
Czechoslovakia is crucial to the WTO and the Soviet Union,
both economically and geographically. In view of the
resentment towards the Soviets in the population at large
(from which the military is drawn) because of the occupation
of their country and the reimposition of Stalinist-type
economic and political controls, can the Soviets depend on
the military to remain neutral during future internal
crises, and, more importantly for this analysis, can they
rely on the military to fight wholeheartedly in case of a
war with NATO?
In order to evaluate that question, one must first
examine the three periods of Czechoslovak military history
in which they did nothing to defend the national interests
of the state— 1938, 1948, and 1968. What was the attitude
of the armed forces in 1938 when President Benes decided not
to resist Hitler? Would they have fought to defend tneir
country's freedom had they been called upon to lo so?
Based on the outstanding performance of the Czechoslovak
Legions in World War I, and the pride that the people of
Czechoslovakia felt in their newly won independence, it
seems highly likely that the nilitary would have resisted
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had they been called upon [Ref. 36]. That they were willing
and ready to fight is supported evan by statements from
President Benes 1 himself. He stated in his memoirs that in
1935, the Czechoslovak military hell its first large scale
maneuvers, with a delegation from the Soviet Union partici-
pating; and 1936 and 1937 saw "practical co-opsration in the
sphere of aviation, armaments, and the mutual exchange of
political and military information" between the Czechs and
the Soviets. And in May of 1938, the Czechoslovak military
was mobilized [ Bef . 37]- Thus it appears to have been a
political decision, consistent with Czechoslovak political
culture, and not a lack of willingness to fight on the part
of the military which resulted in their nonparticipation in
the German takeover.
When 3enes returned from exile after World War II, he
believed both intellectually (based on the "betrayal" by the
West and the cooperation begun by the Czechoslovak-Soviet
Treaty of 1935) and pragmatically (in view of the "libera-
tion" by the Soviets and their continuing efforts to under-
mine democratic elements in the country) that alliance with
the Soviet Onion was the best way to guarantee the security
and independence of his country. The Kosice Program (April
1945) was the instrument drawn up to implement those
beliefs. The military clause is of the most interest here.
It pledged complete cooperation with the Red Army and abso-
lute adherence to the Soviet mcdel of structuring its armed
forces.
Since the communists were not in complete control at
this time, the democratic forces in the country attempted to
balance communist influence by insisting that pro-Western
officers hold top-level key military positions [Ref. 38].
The officer corps that resulted from trying to satisfy both
forces was quite varied— "bourgeois" according to the commu-
nists, since only 605 were members of the Party--and in 1946
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the Party insisted on a "review" of its membership to weed
out "Nazi collaborators."
Prime Minister Klement Gottwald and the Communist Party
were not satisfied with the results and took their own steps
to change the composition. First, twenty military and prem-
ilitary schools staffed by Soviet instructors, were opened
and Gottwald personally appealed to the working-class and
peasant families to enroll their sons in reserve officer
training programs. By 1947 there were over 5000 students in
these schools. Second, an exchange program was initiated
between Soviet and Czechoslovak officers, with selected
officers being sent to the Soviet Union for advanced mili-
tary study. Third, officers of air and air-support units of
the Czechoslovak First Army Cor^s 3 replaced strongly
pro- Western Air Force officers, even though the First Army
officers' experience in air warfare was limited. The
Communist Party proudly proclaimed that by 1948 there were
3000 loyal Party members among the officer corps and that
about one-third of the officers that had been reinstated
after World War II had left or had been replaced. Thus the
foundation of a loyal officer cadre was built. [Eef. 39]
Despite the success of these efforts, at the time of the
February 1948 Communist take-cver, pro-Western officers
still controlled most of the top-level positions, and the
military was called upon by neither side during the crisis.
They remained, as previously mentioned, confined to their
barracks. Would the armed forces have resisted in 1948 had
they been called upon? The army's intelligence network had
been almost completely infiltrated by the KGB and communica-
tion between officers who would have resisted was seriously
restricted, but theoretically it was still possible
3 After Hitler's invasion, many Czechoslovak military
members made their way to various allied fronts to fight the
Nazis. The First Army Corps was made up of men who fought in
the Soviet Union under the leadership of the Russians.
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[Ref. 40]. Had resistance occurred spontaneously, it would
have strengthened Benes 1 resclve to stand up to the
Communists and call for new elections rather than accede to
their power grab. But Czechoslovak military tradition does
not seem to include action independent from political
instructions. And, having given in in 1938, it is unlikely
that Benes ever seriously thought of calling upon the army
to take a stand that would most likely have resulted in a
bloody civil war. And since it is not the Czechoslovak
military style to intervene on their own, the army once
again remained neutral (or neutralized)
.
In 1950 Alexander Cepicka, Gottwald's son-in-law, was
appointed Minister of Defense. (He was a party apparachik
who had never held military rank.) Tremendous resources
were expended on the military and Cepicka transformed it
into an efficient, trustworthy organization numbering around
250,000. Political education classes were instituted. New
military academies staffed by Soviet officers were opened
and more officers were sent to the Sovist Union for
training. The arms industries were revitalized, and by the
end of the 19 50s Czechoslovakia was virtually self-
sufficient in artillery and small arms. The Soviets consid-
ered the Czechoslovak military reliable enough in 1955 to
allow them to pursue Soviet interests in the Third
world—such as on-site training of "progressive" militaries
and effecting arms transfers tc various countries, notably
Egypt in 1955. [Ref. 41]
With the development of the Warsaw Treaty Organization
in 1955, the Czechoslovak military went from obvious depen-
dence on the Soviet Union to participation in a military
alliance in which it played an integral role. The
Czechoslovak military was given a defined mission important
to Soviet theater defense. Consistent with the Soviet
concept of mobile defense, the Czechoslovaks ware originally
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assigned the wartime responsibility of contributing one
operational group of armies which would fall under Soviet
command. When the Soviet doctrine shifted around 1960 to a
nuclear strategy, however, the Czechoslovak forces
(consisting of ten divisions) were "to form the first
echelon of a southwestern front which was to operate along
the axis Pilsen- Karlsruhe, and eventually reach the Rhein at
the latter city." [Ref. 42] In addition to the mission, the
domestic armament industries began developing more sophisti-
cated weaponry, including a new jet trainer, which brought
it considerable prestige.
After the NATO adoption of the "flexible response"
doctrine, resulting in the subsequent shift in Soviet
doctrine to include the possibility of a conventional phase
to warfare in Europe, the Czechoslovak military training was
also modified to reflect these changes. At this time, the
mid-1960s, initial cautious attempts were initiated to
differentiate Czech military doctrine and organization from
the Soviet model. While there were two primary factors
influencing this development (resentment of the complete
Soviet domination of the WTO and the insistence that all
member states subscribe exactly to Soviet defense concepts
regardless of national requirements, and the concern over
the potential impact on Czechoslovak security of the Soviet
reappraisal of the possibility cf a limited war in Europe)
,
the likely catalyst for the rethinking of the defense prob-
lems in Czechoslovakia may have been the Romanians' ques-
tioning of Soviet intentions in 1963. [Ref. 43]
The government of Romania agreed to permit joint WTO
exercises to be conducted on its territory in 1962 and 1963.
After that it refused absolutely to allow any other exer-
cises to be held there. While the details of these exer-
cises are not known, assuming they were similar to the
exercises conducted in Bulgaria (the only othar WTO member
40
without Soviet troops on its territory which had a coast on
the Black Sea and mountainous and forested areas) in 1964
and 1967, Romanian reluctance would be understandable. A
Soviet-Bulgarian study on the 1967 exercises indicated that
the maneuvers included a "defensive" battle by air and naval
forces and airborne troops for the seizure of the sea coast
and actions in the forest and mountain areas.
If the exercises in Romania included these same
elements, it is likely that the Romanians' reasoned that the
primary purpose for the exercises was not preparation for a
war with NATO but the restriction of their capability to
resist a Soviet invasion ( vis-a-yis Hungary in 1 956) -
Additionally, the study revealed a method of operations
which, if used in the exercises in Romania, would have
further degraded Romanian attempts to evaluate the capabili-
ties of its own forces; i.e., the "mutual exchange of groups
and representatives among the units and formations of
various countries." [Eef. 44] (A more detailed description
of Czechoslovak activities within the WTO will be presented
in the following section.)
Another factor contributing to the rethinking of
Czechoslovakia's role in the W10 was the increasing aware-
ness of the diminishing German threat--alway s a pivotal
determinant in Czechoslovak military policy. Views
expressed by military researchers on this subject were often
said to conflict with the official position of the Novotny
government. Then in 1963 with the publication of the second
edition of Sokolovsky's Military Strategy, the Czechoslovak
military leadership realized that if a limited war occurred
in Europe, they would be sacrificed in the first few days.
WTO operational plans estimated the losses for the south-
western front to be between 60 and 70 percent. By 1967
expressions of disenchantment with this situation had become
widespread within the military, extending probably to the
top leadership. [ Ref . 45]
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Surprisingly enough, the dissatisfaction resulted in
some practical attempts to correct the situation. As early
as 1965 Czechoslovak military researchers developed a new
model of command structure and management of the armed
forces, which presumably reflected nationalistic concerns
and, implicitly, anti-Soviet tendencies, with the military
professionals seeking ways to limit the pervasive Party
control of the armed forces [Ref. 46].
By 1967 the previously apolitical military was beginning
to get actively involved in the demand for liberalization
that was beginning to sweep the country. The catalyst for
this involvement appears to have been an alleged attempt by
top level politicians (Haj. Gen. Jan Sejna, secretary of the
Party Collective of Communists in the Armed Forces, and the
ambitious Gen. Vladimir Janko, deputy minister of Defense)
to use the military to support the tottering leadership of
Antonin Novotny in December 1967 ( not to stage a coup)
.
Unscheduled, rare winter maneuvers took place immediately
preceding the Central Committee Plenum at which Novotny's
continued leadership was to be discussed. Supposedly a
letter was to be delivered to the Central Committee from the
Presidium of the Party in the Armed Forces, headed by Sejna,
supporting Novotny' s conservative position; but it arrived
after the vote had been taken to oust Novotny. Reportedly
this maneuver failed because Maj. Gen. Vaclav Prchlik, chief
of the Main Political Administration, alerted the
anti-Novotny forces on the Central Committee. [ Ref . 47 ]
As Alexander Dubcek assumed the role of First Secretary
in January 1968, the Czechoslovak search for their own
national defense doctrine became the subject of public
discussions. In mid-April, 1968, Col. Vojtech Mencl, rector
of the Klement Gottwald Military-Political Academy in
Prague, and several of his colleagues began to review
Czechoslovak strategic doctrine. They concluded it was not
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suitable for their needs because it allowed the commander of
the WTO to determine the strategic role and tactical func-
tions of the Czechoslovak armed forces. They wanted to
revise this doctrine to allow them to deal with the Soviet
Union as an ally rather than as a subordinate. In other
words they wanted the Czechoslovak army under Czechoslovak
command. In May they produced a 100-page document entitled
"On the Action Program of the Czechoslovak People's Army."
It recommended that membership in the WTO continue to be the
basis for its strategy, but listed five other alternatives
that the political/military leadership might wish to
consider
:
1. (Acting within) the framework of the Warsaw Pact, but
with imminent prospects of its bilateral or unilat-
eral abolition.
2. Safeguarding the security of the state within the
framework of its territory or of neutral policies.
3. Initiating proposals for disarmament measures.
4. The creation of conditions that will ensure security
in Europe by means of a European regional collective
security organization.
5. Contingent planning for self-defense relying on our
own means. [ Eef . 48]
It is virtually certain that the Soviets knew about this
document.
In July 1968, a most alarming development (to the
Soviets) occurred with the publication of the "Gottwald
Memorandum," which questioned the rationale behind the WTO,
implying that the NATO threat was overstated, and suggested
that Czechoslovak interests uould be better served by
analyzing issues on a geopolitical rather than class basis
[Ref. 49]. An analyst from the subsequent Husak regime
quoted the Memorandum as suggesting three ways in which
Czechoslovakia could pursue military security:
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1. The coalition principle (an alliance with the Soviet
Union and other states of the Warsaw Pact) on which
our defensive system is based is subject to develop-
ment, and it is necessary to reconsider its validity
in the coming 10 to 15 years.
2. It is possible to think about co-ordinated defense in
Central Europe without the military potential of the
USSR (some kind of military equivalent to the
political Little Entente 'in a socialist form' or
some form of regional collective security organiza-
tions without class determination)
.
3. The possibility of neutralizing one's own means of
defense. [Ref. 50]
To top that off, two weeks later Sen. Prchlik gave a press
conference at which he openly stated to the Czechoslovak
public that perhaps membership in the WTO was not as equal
as it should be ("relations... should be improved in such a
way as to emphasize the real equality of individual
members. ..so that every member of this coalition can really
assert itself.") [Ref. 51] Then making bad matters even
worse, the Ministry of Defense delayed two full weeks before
disavowing that statement in principle. Certainly this loss
of control by the conservatives within the Czechoslovak
military contributed to the Soviet decision to invade.
[Ref. 52]
The August invasion terminated ail reforms and reestab-
lished party control over the military, reinforced by a
strong Soviet presence. At the beginning of the invasion
the armed forces were disarmed and restricted to their
barracks. The Soviets then occupied the best military
installations forcing the Czechoslovak units to camp out
until new accommodations could te built. A shadow General
Staff manned by Soviet officers took over the daily
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management of the armed forces, and then assumed control of
all important positions in the Czechoslovak Ministry of
Defense. Czechoslovak military officials were not allowed
to function in their official capacities. [Eef. 53]
In order to reestablish Party control in the armed
forces, it was necessary to rescind some 1,515 military-
related decisions and resolutions made during Dutcek's rule
£Ref. 54]. Some 17,000 officers were suspected of being
sympathetic to the reform movement, but to eliminate that
many would likely have meant the total disintegration of the
armed forces. Even so, some 11,000 officers and 30,000
noncommissioned officers were removed from the service
during that period. Another extremely serious problem was
the voluntary mass resignations of officers. In 1969, some
57.83 of all officers under the age of 30 left, and 507 of
the students in the military academies resigned by June
1969. [Eef. 55]
The repercussions of the invasion are still being felt
today. A drastic shortage of command personnel is still
evident, and the military has difficulty recruiting young
men. They also encounter difficulties in interesting career
officers in Party membership, despite the benefits that go
along with it. The plain fact is that the failure of the
armed forces to resist the Soviet invasion destroyed the
prestige of the military in the eyes of the average citizen.
The old image of being subservient to an imposed ruler
(first the Emperor, then the Soviets), expensive, and
useless in defending the nation was reinforced [Eef. 56].
Obviously, the Soviet confidence in the reliability of the
Czechoslovak armed forces dropped sharply after 1968.
A brief examination of the following questions should
allow us to make a more accurate estimate of their current
usefulness to the Soviets:
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1. What is the current mission of the Czechoslovak mili-
tary within the WTO?
2. How much new military eguipment/weapons systems have
the Soviets provided the Czecnoslovak armed forces
since 196 3?
3. In view of the highly developed armaments industry in
Czechoslovakia, what equipment have the Soviets
licensed for production there and what
Czechoslovak-developed equipment is used throughout
the WTO?
4. Do specialized units, such as airborne troops, exist
in Czechoslovakia? (These units play a special,
critical role in Soviet plans to seize the initiative
in a war with NATO- They will be dropped behind
enemy lines to disrupt NATO mobilization and/or
movement in the first crucial hours of the attack.)
Among the most substantive measures of the decline in
the trustworthiness of the Czechoslovak military from the
Soviet viewpoint is the downgrading of their mission in the
WTO. They are still to be used in a southwestern front;
however, they are now directly subordinate to a Soviet
commander and Soviet units will be fighting alongside them.
In view of the lessening of hostility between the Germans
and Czechoslovakians and the general lack of enthusiasm for
the Soviets and their methods, it is likely that the Soviets
would prefer to put their own troops (i.e. the Central Group
of Forces) against the American and German forces (reputed
to be the best in NATO) and keep the Czechoslovak troops
well in the rear in support positions.
Another way of looking at the Soviets' decision to let
the Czechoslovak troops form the leading edge of the south-
western front by themselves was the fact that there were no
Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia befora 1968, which
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gave the Soviets little option in the matter. Since the
troops on this front would bear the brunt of the first
confrontation with American and West German troops, they
would most likely suffer heavy casualties, ridding the
Soviet Union of much potential opposition in the aftermath
of the war. This idea of being used as "cannon fodder" was
discussed among the top echelcns of Czechoslovak military
thinkers in the early 1960s when they were attempting to
develop their own military doctrine. There was, however,
no doubt that Soviet confidence in the Czechoslovak military
plunged after the 1S68 Prague Spring. Putting Czechoslovak
units side by side with Soviet units is probably an indica-
tion that not only can they not be trusted to wholeheartedly
carry out an offensive against the Western forces, but that
the Soviets would also not want them to be left alone in the
rear.
Just how well equipped is the Czechoslovak military and
at what junctures did the Soviets introduce newer weapons?
Table I gives a comparison cf equipment available from
1964-1983. Before the 1968 invasion, the Czechoslovak mili-
tary was considered to be one of the best in Eastern Europe,
particularly the air force. The armed forces lost over
40,000 men as a result of the purges after 1968, and as the
statistics indicate, there was no modernization of any kind
until 1972 when the T-62 medium tank was added to the inven-
tory, along with three helicopter models. That year there
was a significant upgrading of the ground defenses with the
introduction of the Frog and Scud surface-to-surface
missiles (SSM) and the anti-tank guided weapons (ATGW)
Snapper, Swatter, and Sagger. This was not, however, an
indication of returning trust in the Czechoslovak military
because these same weapons were simultaneously introduced in
the two other Northern Tier states of Poland and East
Germany. By 1974/75 the Soviets had introduced the MiG-23
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rlggger B (replacement for the MiG-21 with the capability to
track and engage targets flying below its own altitude) to
Czechoslovakia, and in 1977, they began installing their
mobile surface-to-air missiles (SArt) , the SA-3, 4, and 6.
This was again a part of an overall upgrading of the air
defense capabilities of the Northern Tier.
The state of the Czechoslovak armed forces in 1984 has
to be considered among the best of the WTO [ Hef . 57]- They
have large numbers of T-54/55 tanks, 100 T-62 and T-72
tanks, and a variety of armored vehicles including the BMP-1
(to be discussed further below) and the SAU-122, a fully-
tracked, amphibious, 22-ton self-propelled artillery piece.*
Another factor reflecting a degree of trust in a WTO
member is permission to build, or develop for organization-
wide use, (and for export) certain pieces of military equip-
ment. Table II indicates which countries have been allowed
to produce which equipment. (This list is not comprehensive
and does net reflect small arms.) The only relatively heavy
and modern pieces authorized fcr production outside of the
Soviet Union are the T-72 medium tank and the newest armored
personnel carrier, BMP-1, 5 which some western commentators
consider to be the finest infartry fignting vehicle in the
world [Eef. 58]. The list of authorized equipment would
hardly allow any build-up of a national armed force apart
from Soviet control. They have made sure that their clients
remain dependent on them for the bulk of the heavy weapons
and new technology. Thus the degree of trust expressed in
Czechoslovakia through its arms production is minimal.
*It has a rate of fire of eight rounds per minute with a
range of 9-15 miles and a top speed of 60 kras. per hour.
Its cruising range is 310 miles.
5 It has a 73mm. gun able tc fire low- veloci ty, rocket-
assisted rounds to engage hard and soft targets.
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The existence of specialized units, such as airborne
units or amphibious assault units, could indicate a degree
of trust, in at least the members of such a unit, because of
its special mission. According to Friedrich Wiener,
Special airborne units of Warsaw Pact armies have
general missions of reconnaissance and sabotage, as well
as tactical missions of destroying or securing bridges
or single targets behind enemy lines. In preparation
for large air- landing operations, these units might be
used to capture needed airports by surprise in special
operations similar to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
It has been confirmed that the special airborne units of
the East German, Polish, and Czechoslovak armies conduct
training exercises wearing the uniforms of the West
German Bundeswehr, the Danish Army, the British Army of
the Rhine and the U.S. 7th Army. Hand in hand with this
is special language training and comprehensive learning
of the inner workings of these armies. [Ref. 59]
Supposedly an elite unit exists near Holesov which is
staffed exclusively by volunteers [Ref. 60]. One can be
sure that the Soviets screened each member intensively
before allowing them to participate in such a sensitive
mission. The degree of confidence in this unit in a war
with NATO would have to be higher than in the overall army,
but one could surmise the Soviets mignt still prefer to use
them in less crucial missions.
Taken together these four aspects (the mission, equip-
ment, licensing procedures, and the existence of an airborne
unit) provide a mixed picture of reliability which seems
rather accurate. The Soviets, for their own reasons, have
felt a need to upgrade the overall military capabilities of
the WTO Nations, especially the Northern Tier, and have
taken advantage of the high stage of development of the
armament industry in Czechoslovakia, thus giving an appear-
ance of increased trust in its "ally." However, as in prac-
tically every other aspect of Soviet life, particularly the
international one, political considerations take precedence
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over everything. The situation in Czechoslovakia is quies-
cent, but the spirit of loyalty is not there, and the
Soviets know it. As long as it takes the physical presence
(or threat of renewed occupation should tney ever decide to
withdraw their forces) or the imposition of a rigid polit-
ical control system to ensure loyalty, the Soviets are not
likely to have much confidence in Czechoslovakian willing-
ness to fight wholeheartedly for the Soviets in war.
D. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IB THE »T0
The extent of participation in the Warsaw Treaty
Organization gives us one last angle from which to examine
the reliability of the Czechoslovak armed forces from the
Soviet viewpoint.
Czechoslovakia participated in 25 WTO exercises from
1961-1979 (9 from 1961-1968 and 16 from 1968-1979). In 1962
there was a joint ground forces/combined arms exercise
involving Czech, Soviet, and Eolish troops on Czechoslovak
territory; in 1964 there were two exercises, both in
Czechoslovakia— one involving Czech, Polish, and Soviet
troops, the other involving Soviet and Czech command staffs.
In 1966 the Vltava exercises were conducted on Czechoslovak
soil involving Czech, East German, Hungarian, and Soviet
forces. This exercise served as preparation for an even
larger exercise in 1968 which provided the perfect cover for
the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Polish, East German,
Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Soviet troops. During the same
time period (1961-1968), Czech troops participated in two
other exercises held in another country and three held
jointly in Czechoslovakia and another country [Ref. 61].
There was a common pattern in the staging of these exer-
cises. Approximately one-third on home territory, one-third
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on foreign territory, and one-third jointly on home and
foreign territory. The same pattern occurred in the assign-
ment of exercise commanders. One-third of the time national
armed forces were commanded by their own officers and two-
thirds of the time they were ccmmanded by foreign officers
[Ref. 62]. (See Figure 1.2) The Czech experience deviated
from this pattern before 1968 and conformed to it after the
Soviet invasion.
Prior to 1968, half of the exercises (8) took place in
Czechoslovakia, two took place cutside the country, one took
place jointly on Czechoslovak and Hungarian territory, and
one jointly on Czechoslovak, GDB, Polish, and Soviet terri-
tory. After the invasion in 1968 and the establishment of
the Soviet Central Group of Forces, the pattern of exercises
coincided with that of the three other states with Soviet
troops. [ Hef . 63]
The question is why were there more exercises in
Czechoslovakia during the 1961-1968 period? Czechoslovakia
was considered a reliable ally until 1960, evidenced by the
type of weaponry it was producing and its activity in Third
World areas of Soviet interest. It seems likely that by
1963/64 the Soviet information network was picking up signs
of disaffection and national initiative among Czech intel-
lectuals (destalinization) and military leaders (vis-a-vis
independent national defense doctrine) and, wanting to avoid
another situation such as the cne that occurred in Hungary
in 1956, they decided to take precautionary steps to fore-
stall any problems. Since there were no Soviet troops
stationed in Czechoslovakia the frequent exercises there
served not only to familiarize Soviet and HT3 troops with
the area, but placed them conveniently within striking
distance should intervention be necessary.
By the 1980s, the Soviets had turned the FTO into a
highly integrated body with modern, conventional military
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forces. Since the mid-1970s there nas been an increase in
the bilateral cooperation between Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and the GDR in which the Soviets are only minimally, if at
all, involved- This includes such things as officer
exchanges for advanced military study (e.g. Polish officers
attending the GDR f s Friedrich Engels Military Academy) and
training exercises for the three countries without the pres-
ence of Soviet military units. This training enhances the
ability of these troops to operate independently of Soviet
troops in rear areas or on a separate front. This somewhat
unusual activity could be viewed as a sign of confidence in
the Northern Tier countries, since it obviously could not
occur without the approval of the Soviet Union; however, in
view of the political situation in Czechoslovakia and that
in Poland, even maneuvers with Soviet approval are likely to
be viewed with caution and efforts to control the t jpe of
cooperation could be expected. [Ref. 64]
E. CZECHOSLOVAK PARTICIPATION IN COMECON
Czechoslovakia was one of the original members of
COMECON, having been pressured by Stalin to reject Marshall
Plan aid. It was a highly industrialized country prior to
World War II and still had many of its industrial assets
intact after the war. In accordance with the Stalinist
model, industrial investments were given priority, and the
economy grew steadily until 1975. At that point, the inef-
ficiencies inherent in a centrally planned economy,
accentuated by the energy crisis and the recession in the
West, began to assert themselves.
One problem was the high energy and material inputs
required for a unit of industrial output. In the mid-1970s
Czechoslovak machinery often weighed doubls comparable
Western equipment and was usually 20% less productive.
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Export prices of Czechoslovak machinery dropped sharply on
the world markets because of snail deficiencies in perform-
ance and lack of reliable parts and service after the sale.
Additionally, export sales to the Soviet Union require the
best of the Czechoslovak machinery, leaving older or less
productive equipment for the domestic industry. This does
not aid in improving production or conserving energy.
[Eef. 65]
Other criticisms range from producing too broad a range
of machinery instead of specializing, problems with design
limitations, and the long period of time required to
complete investment projects. Construction time was often
double and sometimes triple that required in the West,
freezing funds for inordinate amounts of time and making
some equipment nearly obsolete tefore it was completed. Old
equipment is retired slowly. In 1976 some one-third of the
equipment was over fifteen years old, with some pieces
dating back to pre-World War II. Unfortunately the plan-
ners' ability to correct deficiencies in the industrial
sector is somewhat limited because machinery is the coun-
try's main export. [fief. 66 J
In 1960 Czechoslovakia depended on coal for 885? of its
energy consumption- 3y 1975 it was down to 753 because of
growing oil imports. By 1977 it was down further to 62^ in
spite of an increased emphasis on coal to combat rising oil
prices. Energy requirements were just increasing faster
than coal output. This increasing need was met primarily by
oil and natural gas imports. 3y 1979 oil imports were up
907a over 1970 and gas was up 440%. The refinery capacity
had to be expanded to accommodate this increase, and all but
a small percent of the refined crude oil was consumed domes-
tically. Since the Soviet Union supplied 95% of
Czechoslovakia's gas and oil imports, when the prices were
almost doubled in 1975, significant pressure was placed on
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their economy. Nevertheless, in 1930, a Czechoslovak offi-
cial estimated that they were still paying one-fourth the
world prices for oil imports. [Ref. 67]
It became evident that a coordinated energy policy was
necessary, though, and in the 1970s a short- and long-term
policy was established. Conservation was to be essential in
the 1980s because, while the supply of Soviet natural gas
was expected to increase, the supply of oil was expected to
be held at levels around that of 1975. In the short run,
domestic coal would help meet the energy demands, but the
increase would be slow and costly since most veins were deep
deposits. In the long run, the plan was to rely on nuclear
energy.
As part of the "Concerted Plan of Multilateral
Integration Measures" previously mentioned, Czechoslovakia
was to supply reactors and other equipment for use domesti-
cally and by other COMECON members in the production of
nuclear power plants. In late 1978, the first major nuclear
power plant began operation at Jaslovske Sohunice, at least
a year behind schedule. By 1980 it accounted for 6% of the
total electricity supplied, and should increase to about 137,
by 1985. If the schedule is maintained, by 19 90 expansion
of this power station, construction of additional stations,
and the import of electricity from joint nuclear projects in
the Soviet Union will account for about 30% of total elec-
trical supply. [Ref. 68]
Czechoslovakia has long been known for its conservative
fiscal policy. The statistics indicate that it maintained
trade surplus with all its trade partners as late as 1960,
and by 1976 it still maintained an overall trade surplus,
although it was running a rather hefty negative balance with
industrialized Western countries. 1977, however, was a
different story. For the first time, Czechoslovakia ran an
overall deficit; and by 1978, that deficit had increased by
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155*. It began running a deficit both with the COMECON
countries (particularly the Soviet Union) and the industri-
alized West.
In November 1980, the U.S. Department of Commerce
reported that both nuclear and coal-mining programs were
already behind schedule and the energy conservation efforts
had produced only minimal results [Ref. 69]. A similar
report in May, 1983, indicated that construction on the
second site, and possibly expansion work on the first, was
suffering from labor shortages and supply delays and was
lagging nearly a year behind schedule [Ref. 70]. The
statistics also conclude that Czechoslovakia is increasingly
directing its trade toward the Soviet Union and the COMECON
countries and away from the West in accordance with its
cautious fiscal policy. Certainly another factor in the
latter development is that since 1968 Czechoslovakia has
tended to follow the Soviet policy line more slavishly than
other countries, and with the increasing chill in US-USSR
relations, a move away from the West could be expected.
One final comment must be made. Economic analyst Jan
Vanous estimated the total Czechoslovak trade deficit in
1979 to be about 2.8 billion dollars at world market prices
and in 1980 about 4.2 billion dollars. However, at least
60% of that figure is covered by implicit Soviet subsidies
on exports of fuels and non-focd raw materials. This does
not increase their external debt, but it makes
Czechoslovakia more politically and economically beholden to
the Soviet Union than ever. [Ref. 71]
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III. THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
A. THE GERHAN POLITICAL CULTURE
The origins of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) go
back to 1946 when Stalin made it clear that the Soviet Union
intended to permanently retain influence in the postwar
development of Germany. The Soviet Military Administration
began expropriating the holdings of leading Nazis and war
criminals and nationalizing the heavy industry (what was
left of it after massive dismantling as reparation for
Soviet losses during the war) in 1946. Later that year, the
Soviets forced the merger between the Social Democratic
Party (SPD) and the Communist tarty (KPD) resulting in the
establishment of the Socialist Unity Party (SSD) which was
under complete Communist (i.e. Soviet) control [Ref. 72].
These actions spurred the Western Allies into implementing
the European Recovery Plan (i.e. the Marshall Plan) in 1947,
and they offered to extend its aid to Germany.
In June 1948, Stalin halted all Allied ground access to
Berlin for 11 months, hoping to prove to the Allies that
Eerlin was indefensible and to make them withdraw. The
blockade did not work. When the Allies subsequently asked
the Fest Germans to set up a government of their own to
include the three Western occupation zones (culminating in
the Basic Law, completed in May 1949), Stalin swung into
action, determined that if he could not succeed in getting a
neutralized Germany (which he hoped would ultimately fall
under Communist control, directly or indirectly), at least
he would prevent the resurgence of a united Germany.
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Therefore, in October 1949, he announced the formal exis-
tence of the German Democratic Eepublic.
It is not enough, however, to just examine the relations
between the government, people, and the Soviet Union from
1949 on because the people, before they are East Germans,
are first Germans. In order to assess their current reli-
ability as a Soviet ally, one must compare the historical
differences and similarities between the two cultures.
The German tribes inherited the traditions of the Holy
Roman Empire and the legacy of Charlemagne, and were, from
the tenth to the twelfth centuries, the only element of
stability in northern and central Europe. After driving the
Nordic invaders back and stopping Slavic raids in the east,
the Germanic tribes formed a strong union with the Papacy
and established peace in the center of Europe. This peace
produced a revival of trade and the beginnings of urbaniza-
tion in the German states, and was accompanied by recurring
efforts of the German emperors to break the power of the
princes and consolidate their gains. The princes, however,
resisted Imperial control, and during the twelfth century
many allied themselves with the Pope against the German
emperor. By the thirteenth century, the bargains that
German emperors were forced tc make with the princes for
their support against the Papacy had effectively "pulled the
rug" from under the feet of the German monarchy; and the
fragmentation of German lands into independent units,
governed by separate princes whc recognized only the vaguest
connection with Imperial authority, was complete.
With this fragmentation there was a chanje in Germany's
position in Europe. As a result of the Thirty Years' VT ar,
Germany suffered a loss of about 35% of its population, plus
terrible destruction cf property and deprivation of access
to the sea. This turned Germany into an impoverished and
handicapped land, the fragmentation of which was legitimized
59
by the Treaty of Westphalia. Thus German disunity became a
part of the "natural order" of things in Europe.
The traumatic effects of the Thirty Years War made a
lasting imprint on the German psyche. The survivors were
willing to submit unconditionally and uncritically to any
authority that seemed strong enough to prevent a recurrence
of those horrors. And, with time, this excessive deference
to authority also became a part of the "natural order,"
acquiring the added weight of tradition.
The life of the average German in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries was extremely provincial. The
characteristics of the small communities (1,000-10,000 in
population) in which the majority of the Germans lived were
the preeminence of local traditions and customs, close
social integrity, and an extreme resistance to change. The
great intellectual movement of the eighteenth century, the
Enlightenment, had little effect in most average small
towns.
The idea of a constitutional government, responsive to
an educated and self-reliant citizenry became the program
for nineteenth century Liberalism. For the same reasons
that many Germans resisted the Enlightenment, they also
resisted the onslaught of Liberalism. Instead of these
ideas, the inner development of the individual and of the
German nation as a unique cultural entity was emphasized.
Because their energies were directed inward, this left the
decisions for the well being of the ordinary people to the
State and its agents. [Ref. 74] (These characteristics were
to aid the communists significantly in forcing the people
who remained in the Soviet-occupied portions of Germany to
accept yet another form of goverment in which they were to
have no say.)
It was not until 1871 when Prince Otto von Bismarck
succeeded in actually uniting all thirty-eight German
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states. (The Congress of Vienna in 1815 had decided that 38
German states would be more efficient and manageable than
the previously existing 300.) At that time, Wilhelm I
accepted the crown of the new German empire. That experi-
ence did not, however, give the Germans any real experience
with democratic rule. It was simply a continuation of rule
by a central authority; therefore, the Germans entered the
twentieth century without a firm foundation in the liberal,
democratic traditions that other major Western European
powers had acquired. with a sense that a constitutional
government was somehow " un-German. " Even the Weimar
Republic of 1919 did not represent a true break with the
traditional German form of government because most of the
crucial positions remained in the hands of those whose
primary loyalty was to the institutions of the past. Under
these circumstances the Republic had little chance for
survival even if it had received the unqualified support of
the other Western democracies, which it did not.
The atrocities committed during the Third Reich
certainly gave the surviving Germans much to want to forget.
They were pariahs in the international system; but with the
destruction of the Third Reich, they also had a chance to
start over again. How would they do things differently this
time—democracy or communism or something uniquely German?
B. THE GOVERNMENT
How has the German tradition affected the people living
in the GDR today? What is their relationship with the
ruling Communist regime? The East German population
continues to hold many of the traditional German values
because they still have not been exposed to the experience
of democracy, as have their counterparts in the West. The
natural inclination of the Germans to respect authority
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unguestioningly has no doubt been of benefit to the commu-
nist leadership, which in the early 1950s was completely
dependent upon the Soviet Union—economically , militarily,
politically, and ideologically- Not only was the eastern
part of Germany much less industrially developed, but the
Soviets had dismantled many industries and factories and
moved them physically to Russia in payment for German
aggression. The GDR was denied the economic stimulus of the
Marshall Plan that the Western sectors received, and the
nationalization of the industry was so complete that any
incentives to increase efficiency and productivity were also
stifled.
In 1952 the 5ED* leadership , headed by Walter Ulbricht,
proclaimed that the GDR was launching a program to "build
Socialism," which meant first the rapid expansion of heavy
industry. However, since the GDR was so poor in hard coal
deposits and iron and steel-making capacity, huge invest-
ments in massive projects to increase their capabilities
inevitably meant that living standards would suffer. By
1953 there were practically no consumer goods and very few
food staples available. The second, and egually important,
phase of building socialism was an intensification of the
class struggle. This meant the middle class, the churches,
and what was left of private enterprise would be strictly
subjected to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy in every way.
In order to force them to follow the approved line, ration
cards were withdrawn from offenders, which meant the indi-
viduals had to pay greatly inflated prices for food staples,
assuming they were available. Children of owners of private
businesses or active young Christians could hardly obtain
permission to continue their studies, no matter how good
their grades. A great program of collectivization of agri-
culture was initiated, which caused a mass exodus of farmers
to the West, which in turn produced great food shortages.
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Failure to meat targets (often unreasonable to begin with)
in industry and agriculture was considered sabotage and
there were many trials for economic crimes.
To make bad matters worse, the SED leadership announced
their intentions to raise an army to defend the achievements
of the state. Many Germans
,
ycung and old, were opposed to
this. Only extreme pressure, high pay, and extra privileges
could have possibly produced the number of recruits they
wanted. And to all these problems was added the heavy
strain of reparations to the Soviet Union and Poland. While
the grim economic situation was bad enough, the atmosphere
of fear, suspicion, and uncertainty was even worse. This
period was a copy (although to a lesser degree) of the Great
Purges in the Soviet Union. This was aptly illustrated by a
comment by 3ishop Moritz Mitzenheim:
Late in the evening or during the night a person will be
'taken away* by two persons in civilian clothes, wno
identify tnemselves as members of the criminal police.
In most cases no reason will be given for the arrest,
nor will an arrest warrant be served. [ Ref . 75]
It was this situation that caused some 770,000 Germans to
seek asylum in the west by 1953. [Ref. 76]
When the government tried to correct the economic situ-
ation by raising production norms even further, open revolt
occurred. On 9 June 1953, the SED leadership announced the
institution of a "New Course," (a reflection of the relax-
ation of controls in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death)
.
They admitted that the Party and the government had made
serious mistakes which the New Program would correct.
Discrimination against farmers, craftsmen, the intelli-
gentsia, and their children would cease immediately. Price
increases would be withdrawn. Pressure on the teachers to
adhere to Marxism-Leninism would oe abandoned. Many Party
"moderates" hoped that with this the Party would be able to
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make a fresh start. But many workers were angry that the
higher work norms for the same pay had not been rescinded,
and they felt that the time to speak up had come.
On 17 June construction workers in East Berlin went on
strike and called for others to do the same. Over 270
localities responded, involving around 372,000 workers—
about 5% of the labor force. Even though 5% was a rela-
tively small number, the psychological impact of the workers
demonstrating against "their" government was tremendous.
The workers were joined by many other sympathizers and the
demands spread out to include restoration of the unions and
free elections.
It was the latter demand that panicked the SED leader-
ship and caused them to order the young men of the People's
Police to stop the riot. When that was not enough force to
quell the demonstrations, the SED called on the Soviet armed
forces for assistance. The uprising resulted in bloodshed
and heavy punishment for hundreds of the participants.
Ultimately the economic demands of the strikers were
granted, but the political ones were not. [Sef. 77]
What was the position of the members of the SED during
this period? There were moderate and hardline factions
within the SED, as with the other Communist parties. When
Walter Ulbricht very narrowly escaped being overthrown after
the June riot, one might have expected him to try to come to
some accommodation with the moderate faction, which was
closer to the people; but he went on the offensive and began
a purge to get rid of them. This accomplished, he still
could not produce a party program for the Fourth Party
Congress because of the uncertain situation in the Soviet
Union, showing just how dependent the GDR party was on the
CPSO. Instead he reemphasized the basic aspects of
Stalinism, refusing to liberalize anything. At this
Congress the SED did claim for the first time to be the
guide in all aspects of life in the GDR.
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The delegates were disappointed at these pronouncements,
having hoped for indications that living standards were
going to increase as rapidly as they were in West Germany.
Nevertheless, they still gave unanimous support to
Ulbricht's proposals, providing the leadership with a veneer
of legitimacy. Most of the delegates felt this was part of
the transition from a capitalist state to a socialist one,
and the best they could do at the moment was to suffer in
silence.
As of 1 January 1954 the Soviet anion renounced any
claim to further reparations and Poland followed suit. The
GDR allies elevated the status of their diplomatic represen-
tations in East Berlin from legations to embassies. Gn 25
March 1954 the Soviets declared that the GDR was free to
handle its own internal and foreign policy, including its
relations with West Germany, while retaining its rights as
specified under the Four Power Agreement. In May of 1955,
the Warsaw Treaty Organization was formed and the GDR was
invited to become a member; then on 20 September, the Soviet
Union and the GDR signed a treaty agreeing to conduct their
mutual relations based on "full equality, mutual respect for
sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs."
[Ref. 78]
Yet in spite of every attempt to confer legitimacy on
the regime, an average of 230,000 intellectuals, lawyers,
scientists, doctors, technicians, and engineers fled each
year to the West. Escape was as simple as going to one of
the Western sectors of Berlin and applying for assistance in
flying to the West. Gordon Craig graphically describes
these years:
The never-ending heresy-hunting and the horrendous
penalties meted out for supposed crimes against the
State,. ..the unrelieved thought control, and the tedious
nagging by party watchdogs made life in the GDR intoler-
able for spirited and talented people; and even many who
were ideologically committed to the Communist
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cause.. .were moved to leave the country by Ulbricht's
periodic striking out at people he considered dangerous
opponents, like Wolfgang Ranch, professor of Marxist
philosophy, who was sentenced to ten years at hard labor
in 1957 for demanding intellectual liberty and a more
flexible form of Socialism. £Ref. 79]
Seventy-four percent of the almost 2,900,000 refugees were
under 45 years of age, and 50 percent under 25, and they
included many specialists whose skills were badly needed.
One year the entire law faculty of the University of Leipzig
defected.
In August 1961, the number of refugees reached 2,000
aday. Walter Ulbricht's solution to this problem was a
permanent blockade of Eerlin— no one would fly in or out of
the city without his permission! This solution was appar-
ently too drastic for the Soviets, however, and he was
instructed to only block the traffic between the Eastern and
Western sectors of the city. And so, on 13 August 1961, the
East German police strung barbed wire and put up roadblocks
along the inner boundary of the eight districts in the
Soviet sector of Berlin, followed by the construction of a
cement wall (when the West mounted no effective opposition)
guarded from watch towers by armed sentries who had orders to
shoot anyone attempting to go ever it.
In the months after the closing of the primary escape
hatch to the West, the East Germans seemed to come to terms
with the realities of their new existence and were ready to
begin making the most of their lives. The government
responded to this mood by instituting the "New Economic
System" which established more reasonable production goals
and put a greater emphasis upon achievement, managerial
skills, and lessening excessive bureaucratic interference.
There was to be some decentralization of economic decision-
making, the reintroduction cf profit, better trained
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management personnel, the use of cybernetics, and a greater
effort to make GDR products internationally competitive. By
1965, industrial production was reportedly 437 above the
level of 1958 and part of that growth was being passed on to
the consumer. Ownership of televisions went from 5. 1% in
1958 to 48% in 1965 to 74.5% in 1967; refrigerators went
from 2.1% to 2 6% to 43.7%; and washing machines from 1.6% to
28% to 44.3% [Ref. 80]- An important psychological improve-
ment occurred over the Christmas holiday of 1963-64— the
Berlin Wall was opened to let West Berliners visit their
relatives. Over 1.2 million visits were made in the few
days it was open.
The fall of Khrushchev on 15 October 1964 was a complete
surprise to the GDR (as elsewhere) , and the more conserva-
tive mood in Moscow was soon mirrored in the SED. A turning
point was reached in December 1965 when Erich Honecker, heir
apparent to Ulbricht, indicated a return to the old ortho-
doxy. Honecker's ascension to power in 1971 signaled the
end of the New Economic System and Ulbricht' s reinterpreta-
tion of socialism, and the return to strict adherence to the
Soviet interpretations and models.
The New Economic System had not produced the effect that
Ulbricht had hoped for— a quick, qualitative leap into a
higher standard of living by taking advantage of the
scientific-technological revolution— but it did produce a
management strata that was beginning to think independently
outside of Party control. It also encouraged favoritism of
some branches of the economy over others which jeopardized
the overall economic interrelations. The economic situation
was deteriorating in 1969 and 1970. In December 1970, no
doubt significantly influenced by the strikes in Poland
which toppled the Gomulka government, the Central Committee
of the SED terminated the economic reform effort and reinst-
ituted centralized planning. However, they were quite aware
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of the necessity for a balance between investment and
consumer goods, not wanting a repeat of Polish unrest to
occur in the GDR. [ Eef . 82]
The FRG f s Ost politik posed a broad challenge to the
leadership of the GDR, which met it with the idea of
Abqrenzunq (imposing internal policies on its citizens that
would limit/ to the maximum extent possible, contact with
the West). From September 1970 on, the SED tried to dampen
the enthusiasm of their people for contact with the West by
emphasizing the difference between the East and the West.
There was now no such thing as a German nation and culture.
Since the PEG had chosen the path of decadent capitalism,
the citizens of the two states had grown apart, with
different experiences and different consciousnesses. The
Party attempted to force the pace of the development of a
separate GDB consciousness and loyalty using various meas-
ures: replacing, wherever possible the word "German" with
"GDR," and placing more emphasis on the Soviet model in the
media and the schools, for example. [Ref. 83]
At the beginning of 1978, the West German magazine Pe r
Spiegel published paper called "Manifesto of the First
Organized Opposition in the GDR," showing that resistance to
"Sovie tization" of German society did exist in spite of all
the Party's efforts. The first part is distinctly
anti-Soviet in attitude arid calls for the restoration of a
unified German state. The individuals responsible for this
paper still have not been clearly identified, but the SED at
that time reacted swiftly both domestically and against the
FRG, considerably complicating intra-German relations for a
while [Ref. 84 ].
The 1980s saw the beginning of a "peace movement" in the
GDR. On 9 May 1981 a small group of Christians in Dresden
presented a proposal to the East German parliament to enact
a "social peace service" as an alternative to mandatory
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military service. They expressed their concern over the
continuing arms race and the increasing militarism in the
East German society, calling for a two year peace service
involving work in hospitals, old age homes, kindergartens,
etc., as opposed to eighteen months of military service. It
was not until mid- September that the official Party reply to
this proposal was given by the State Secretary for Church
Affairs
:
Peace marches (for example, between Brussels and Paris)
have an alluring effect on ycung people, and the ideas
expressed over there also affect us. Such is the case
of the "social peace service" proposal which, in part,
has also come from the outside. It is normal. .. that
such proposals should also appear among us. Only it
isn't possible. For an entire array of
reasons. ... Whoever is not in agreement with the clear
position of the state on this issue demonstrates that,
ior him, it is a question of confrontation. The demand
for a "social peace service" cannot be justified either
theologically or religiously. ... Moreover , it is not the
task of the church to change laws and the Constitution.
In addition, there are people in the West who desire to
see a confrontation among us. The current regulation
with the construction soldier option is one of the most
progressive in the world. There is no reason to deviate
from it. We need everyone and cannot afford to abolish
mandatory conscription. [Ref. 85]
The issue did not simply go away, as the Party may have
hoped, with that strong warning; and in October 1981, Robert
Havemann, while still under de facto house arrest, sent an
open letter to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev before his
visit to the FRG in 1981. He stated:
Originallv, it seemed that through tne partition (of
Germany) " a dangerous aggressor had been deprived of
power for good and that peace in Europe was insured.
The result, however, has been the opposite. ... What
Germanv's partition created was not security but the
precondition for the deadliest of threats that has ever
existed in Europe. ... What matters above all is to extri-
cate both partners of Germany from the bloc confronta-
tion. In this connection, it is opportune to recall
that ud until the 1960s the Soviet Union called for the
demilitarization and neutralization of all of Germany.
Now, 36 years after the end of the war, it has become an
urgent necessity to conclude the peace treaties and to
withdraw all occupation troops from both parts of
Germany. (It goes without saying that the position of
West Berlin must remain secure.) After this, it should
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be left up to the Germans to determine how we will solve
our national problem—and nobody should fear more than
they do the possibility of nuclear war. [Ref. 86]
And then in December 198 1, Pastor fiainer Eppelmann
issued his so-called Berlin Appeal, listing the peace move-
ment's demands. [Ref- 87]
1. Free all Germany from the East-West conflict.
2. Create a nuclear free zone in Europe.
3. Demilitarize Germany.
4. Sign a peace treaty with both German states
5. Withdraw the "troops of occupation" from both sides.
6. Establish superpower guarantees of non-intervention-
7. Create an alternative to military service.
8. Ban military education in the schools.
9. 3an military parades.
10. Ban war toys from the schools.
11. End civil defense exercises.
By 1982, the unofficial peace movement involved from
2,000 to 5,000 individuals in East Germany [Ref. 38]- Their
main concerns were the positions mentioned above plus police
harassment of people engaged in peace initiatives, and the
contrast between official praise for the Western peace move-
ment and the government's discouragement of the organization
of a similar movement in the GDR.
On the 37th anniversary of the Anglo-U.S. bombing of
Dresden, the first unofficial peace demonstration in the
history of the GDR occurred. After the official ceremonies,
some 5,000 people, mostly young, gathered in the Church of
the Cross to attend a "Peace forum" sponsored by the East
German Evangelical Lutheran Church of Saxony (and approved
by the government) . After the program there, however, some
3,000 of those attending marched across town, without the
approval of the Church or the regime, and held a candle
light vigil in a burned out church which was a war memorial.
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That incident set a precedent for future peace activities in
the GDR. Other forums were scheduled, and in June, a Peace
Workshop was conducted on the ground of the Church of the
Redeemer outside of East Berlin, attracting over 3,000
people. [fief. 89]
The Evangelical Church has a history of playing a promi-
nent role in issues relating tc European security. It was
involved in the 1950s debates ever rearmament and integra-
tion of the FfcG into NATO and the controversy in the GDR
after the introduction of conscription in 1962. One of the
major differences in the present and past situations is that
the current debate is taking place under the aegis of the
partial church-state rapgrochecent worked out between the
church and the Honecker regime in 1971. The church has
consistently avoided putting itself in a position of direct
confrontation with the 5ED, however, it has played a crit-
ical role in the development of the peace movement. First,
in addition to being a source cf moral encouragement and a
rallying point, it has provided a protective umbrella for
independent debate by setting up various "think tanks" to
study the issues. These groups have produced a variety of
position papers on various subjects such as the morality of
nuclear weapons, "Eurostrategic" weapons, and most recently
on balanced troop reductions in the FRG and the GDR. Church
authorities have also been known to intervene to protect
individuals who come into conflict with the state as a
result of their peace activities. [ Ref . 90]
What has been the government's response to the peace
movement? First, there was an intensive campaign by the
FDJ, the official East German ycuth organization, using the
Slogan "Peace Must Be Def ended—Peace Must Be Armed,"
designed to combat any pacifist or anti-militarist tenden-
cies in the young people. Second, it has adjusted its prop-
aganda to counter the attractiveness of certain neutralist
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positions by reminding the people that the Western peace
movement does not mean that the Western governments have any
intention of being peaceful. The people are urged to make
their personal contribution to the preservation of peace by
meeting higher production quotas and overfulfilling the
plan. The rationale for this is the slogan, "The stronger
socialism is, the more secure is peace." Third, they have
strengthened para- military training in schools and have used
the time-tested method of deportation to deal with the more
visible peace activists. If they refused to emigrate, they
would be called up for reservist military duty, refusal of
which can be a prison term of up to eighteen months.
The real question is why hasn't the regime absolutely
cracked down on the movement as it has on so many dissident
movements in the past? One reason was certainly its inter-
national image. 1983 was the 5C0th Anniversary of the birth
of Martin Luther and several programs were scheduled in the
GDR involving international participation. The SED obvi-
ously wanted to put its best face forward. It is also
likely that they realize that harsh repression would result
in a further deterioration of the already-troubled church-
state relations, and further alienate the young people,
which could prove to be counterproductive to long term
stability. Apparently they have decided that the most
prudent course to follow (for the moment anyway) is to
isolate the most radical members of the movement and to try
to coopt as many of the concerns, slogans, and members of
the movement as possible into the officially approved peace
movement. [Ref. 91]
Despite the frequent turbulence on the cultural scene,
the SED has not faced a serious revolt since 1953. What
does this say about the depth of support for the regime? To
a great extent the people of the SDR have been coopted, as
in Czechoslovakia. The reach of the Party is pervasive in
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the society, and it has shown itself ^uite capable of brutal
repression when necessary. The living conditions have
improved, although they have never matched those in the
VTest. The people have acquired a higher level of material
possessions and economic security that they are generally
not willing to risk by open confrontations with the regime.
Many have grown up under communism. They know no other
life, and as the following examination of Party members will
show, they recognize the shortcomings of their system, but
would respond favorably to reforms of the system and not its
aban donment.
There appears to be a growing sense of national identity
and pride in their accomplishments which gives a certain
amount of surface legitimacy to the regime. Whether the
regime can capitalize on these feelings is another matter.
In creating a society that is capable of producing high
quality scientific and technological products, the amount of
education necessary to accomplish this has created a society
capable of thinking and questioning. That quality coupled
with increasing alienation among the young people both from
the crass materialism in the West and from the hypocrisy of
their own regime could make them decide in the future that
material possessions are not enough; that they want intel-
lectual freedom also.
Before examining the important points of GDR/Soviet
relations, a brief look at the composition and attitudes of
the more than two million members of the SED might be
useful. Why did they join? As mentioned above, most have
not known any other political system. It seems that the
majority, especially the intelligentsia, have joined for a
combination of self-interest and the hope that through the
Party they can do something to improve life in the GBR. Few
have any real knowledge of Marx, Engels, or Lanin. Older
members tend to be disillusioned--having witnessed events
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like the June Rising (1953), the denunciation of Stalin
(1956), the fall of Khrushchev (1964), the invasion of
Czechoslovakia (1968), and the treatment of Uxbricht
(197 1)--and have concentrated ol their personal and profes-
sional lives. Most members, young and old,
.
are somewhat
embarrassed by the system's shortcomings and yet they
continue to reject the poverty, crime, and violence of
Western life. They are uneasy about the pervasive milita-
rism in their society, but they continue to play their part.
They are distinctly Western in their tastes—looking to the
West for fashion, films, music, and television. As stated
before, these people would in all likelihood respond to
reforms to the system rather than agitate for its overthrow.
[Sef. 92]
In examining Soviet-GDR relations, it would be helpful
to recap the crisis periods of Olbricht's rule because these
were also the primary times of tension between the SED and
the CPSU. The first challenge came with the workers'
uprising in 1953. The relative ease of being able to go to
the Western sectors and the poor living conditions in the
Eastern sector of Germany were largely responsible for the
uprising, but the fact that the Soviets had to step in to
control the situation considerably lessened their confidence
in Ulbricht in spite of his lcng history as a Moscow man.
His job was on shaky ground for a while, but Stalin's death
caused upheaval in the CPSU as well, and while the new lead-
ership was trying to consolidate its power, they were
content to let Ulbricht continue in his position.
After the uprisings in Hungary and Poland in 1956,
Ulbricht's credibility went up again in the eyes of the
Soviet leaders because he had resisted the liberalization
trend and kept firm control in the GDR. By 1963, Ulbricht
had come to feel that he had a special "in" with the CPSU
and could influence Soviet decisions, at least in regard to
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things that affected the GDR. This confidence led him, in
1967, to "redefine" socialism, which did not please the
Soviets much, but they were too preoccupied with
Czechoslovakia to do much about it at the moment. Ulbricht
again stood firm against the Soviets permitting the liberal-
ization in Czechoslovakia to continue. He pressed hard for
Soviet intervention, and his opinion of the amount of influ-
ence he wielded was no doubt reconfirmed when they did
decide to invade. Ironically, however, the invasion was the
end of his special influence because the Soviet leadership
was no longer weak or undecided.
From that point on, significant differences in the
Soviet and GDR interests began to emerge over the issue of
£§.E££2chement with West Germany. Ulbricht became painfully
aware of his subordinate position when contrary to all his
arguing, he was forced into seme meetings with West German
officials. After Erich Honecker replaced him as First
Secretary, the slightly deviant policies of the GDR fell
absolutely back in line with Scviet wishes. Article 6 of
the 1974 Constitution states that the GDR "is for ever and
irrevocably allied with the Onion of Soviet Socialist
Republics," and is "an inseparable part of the community of
socialist states. Faithful to the principles of socialist
internationalism, it contributes to its strengthening,
cultivates and develops friendship, universal co-operation
and mutual assistance with all states of the socialist
community." [Ref. 93]
In spite of these differences, Soviet-GDR relations have
remained basically harmonious because of a shared funda-
mental objective: the continued commitment to the division
of the German nation [Ref. 94]. The GDR knows that its very
existence is the most valuable single gain in Europe the
Soviet Union has made since World War II and seeks to use
both its strengths and weaknesses to ensure continued Soviet
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commitment. Its strengths are a relatively well developed
economy which supplies the Soviets with more sophisticated
machinery (although this aspect could be of lesser impor-
tance in recent years as the Soviets have gained access to
advanced Western technology) , and its key strategic position
in Europe— facing West Germany and constituting a barrier to
the westward leanings of Polish society. Its primary weak-
ness, of course, is the continuing uncertainty about the
loyalty of the GDR public. [Ref. 95]
To help make sure of continued Soviet interest in its
welfare, the GDR has practically become another Soviet
Republic. It is aware that the Soviet Union could survive
without the GDR, but it is not so sure that it could survive
without the Soviets. Therefore, Honecker has taken great
care to increase and institutionalize Soviet-GDR bilateral
ties. He has faithfully championed all Soviet positions,
sometimes to greater extremes than the Soviets themselves.
There have been "exchanges of experience" at all levels of
party organization, from the very top, through the Central
Committee and Secretariat, to regional, district, and some-
times even individual enterprise organizations. It seems
that these exchanges are well on their way to becoming
formalized. [Ref. 96]
What this amounts to is alnost complete Soviet control
in significant areas of the GDR government, which allows
considerable influence in the GER society. This is one of
the reasons the GDR is considered a reliable Soviet ally.
C. THE HILITA2Y
From a time in the early fifties when the National
People's Army (NVA)
,
just recently upgraded from the desig-
nation as the Garrisoned People's Police, was gratified to
even be saluted by members of the other WTO armies to 1984
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when the NVA soldier takes an oath "to be always ready, side
by side with the Soviet Army and the armies of our socialist
allies, to protect socialism against ail enemies and to risk
my life for the achievement of victory" [Ref. 97], a lot has
happened. It is now recognized as' the number two army in
the WTO. In 1972, Thomas Forster, a German expert on the
NVA, characterized the GDR armed forces in three ways:
1. It had very close ties with the Soviet Army.
2. It had no military doctrine of its own, relying
exclusively on that of the Soviet Onion.
3. It had extensive influence throughout East German
society and government.
Today those characteristics remain the same and have been
amplified. As mentioned earlier, the 1974 Constitution
states that the GDR is "permanently and irrevocably allied
to the U.S.S.R." It has not just adopted Soviet military
doctrine, but is trying to promote complete adoption of
Soviet behavior and ways of thought. And the enhanced
influence of the NVA in the government and society can be
seen in the transfer of control over the entire civil
defense system in 1978 from the Ministry of the Interior to
the Defense Ministry. In civilian life, "defense instruc-
tion" was introduced in 1978 as a compulsory subject in the
9th and 10th grades of the polytechnic schools in spite of
the earlier mentioned opposition by the churches and many
citizens. [Hef. 98]
It is impossible to understand the East German military
or to evaluate its current reliability without understanding
the unigue historical conditions that resulted in its
creation. The fact that the GDR is an artificial Soviet
creation made its military originally an army without a
nation, and thus traditional feelings of patriotism and
loyalty to the nation were absent. This lack of legitimacy
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has resulted in ideology becoming the source of cohesion,
discipline, and morale in the military, which explains the
singleminded obsession with indoctrination in the NVA. RAND
scholar Robert Dean describes the situation as follows:
Because national loyalties that conflict with Party
loyalties are improbable, and because the army has no
separate source of national cohesion and no separate
sense of purpose beyond its defense of the state inter-
ests as defined by the Party, peacetime Party control
ay be facilitated. In other words, the uncertain
olitical legitimacy in the GER tends to reinforce mili-
ary loyalty to the Party- This strong identity of
interests would logically tend to generate an urge
toward subordination in the officer corps. Because
national stewardship cannot serve as a convincing justi-
fication or platform for political intervention, there
is less potential for the officer corps and its leader-
ip to aev<
lent one could make with less certainty about other
sh d velop into a potential counter-elite (a judg-
Warsaw Pact states where the military may see itself as
the repository of national values). [Ref. 99]
The Yalta and Potsdam agreements forbade a German mili-
tary force, but the Soviet Military Administration began
building one almost immediately after the war in their
sector of Germany in the form of a paramilitary people's
police. By December 1946, the People's Police force already
numbered some 45,000. By September 1947, 4,000 men had been
trained as the German Frontier Police and armed with pistols
and the 98 k carbine of the old Wehrmacht, totally disre-
garding the Allied Control Council's directive giving the
control of frontiers and demarcation lines exclusively to
Allied soldiers until the conclusion of a German peace
treaty. During 1948, some 1,000 former Wehrmacht officers
in Soviet POW camps were persuaded to serve in the new
Soviet Zone units, and by summer three types of forces
existed: the regular People's Police (DVP) , the German
Frontier Police (DGP), and the Garrisoned Alert Sguads. The
latter were renamed the Garrisoned People's Police (KVP) and
became the nucleus for the GDP. land, air, and naval forces
[Ref. 100]. When the Soviets created the German Democratic
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Republic in October 1949, they turned the administration of
these forces over to the new government, and by 1950 the KVP
had 70,000 members, the DGP 18,000, and the DVP 80,000 non-
military (mainly administrative) members.
The June 19 53 uprising provided the first opportunity
for use of the KVP, and it proved less than satisfactory.
This group was made up primarily of young men who had grown
up idolizing first Hitler, then Stalin. Their lives had
been turned upside down by the defeat of Hitler and the
death of Stalin. The final stroke was the incomprehensible
order from the government to take up arms against the German
workers who were revolting against "their" government.
These forces were not able {probably in good part because of
a lack of will) to contain the uprising and Soviet troops
and tanks had to be used. That resulted in the purging of
some 12,000 members of all ranks as "unreliable elements."
On January 18, 1956, the East German parliament passed a
bill for the creation of a National People's Army and a
Ministry for National Defense, the final step in the
creation of the GDR military.
As early as January 1956 the Political Consultative
Committee of the WTO decided that all elements of the NVA
should be included in the WTO Joint Armed Forces, but the
transfer was not completed until the mid sixties for polit-
ical reasons (that is, when the West German Bundeswehr was
assigned to NATO). What that transfer in effect meant was
total strategic control (and significant control or influ-
ence in the lower echelons) by the Soviet Union over the GDR
forces.
There is no doubt that this posture has been encouraged
by GDR leadership. One of their fundamental objectives in
case of a war with NATO is to eliminate any chance for a
separate agreement between the Soviet Union and Western
powers at the expense of the GDR. Their military doctrine
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anticipates that one of NATO's strategic objectives would be
to overrun and occupy the GEE as quickly as possible,
isolating it from its allies and making the cost of retaking
that territory unacceptably high. In view of the political
insecurities of the regime, it is likely that they see inte-
gration with the Soviets as the means for ensuring that a
war with the GDR will escalate immediately into a conflict
with the Soviet Union. [Ref. 101]
Evidence of Soviet control of the NVA began from the
very outset of its creation with Soviet-designed officer
training. According to Forster,
As early as 1950 5,000 junior Garrisoned Police officers
went for training to the Soviet Onion in that year
alone. ..By 1975 1,000 NVA officers had graduated xrom
Soviet military academies. In addition to weaponry and
other specialist courses, land and air force officers of
the NVA destined for general rank are given two or three
years training at the Frunze Academy in Moscow, usually
combined with attendance at the Soviet General Staff
Academy. By November 1969 more than a hundred NVA
cadres' had attended the General Staff Academy and
another twenty generals and admirals been through the
Senior Academic Course. For future People's Navy admi-
rals, the services of the 1st Baltic Marine College in
Leningrad and the 2nd Baltic Marine College in
Kaliningrad are available. [ Eef . 102]
In the beginning less than half of the officers had attended
an Officers' College, but since 1979 almost all have. Also
one of every four instructors at the Academy now has earned
a degree at a Soviet academy.
The 1957 Status of Forces Agreement between the GDR and
the Soviet Union regulates the twenty divisions of the
Soviet Group of Forces (S3FG) stationed in East Germany.
Article 18 of this agreement illustrates the difference in
the Soviet treatment of the forces of the GDR and other WTO
countries. It states
in case of any threat to the security of Soviet troops
stationed on GDR territory, the Supreme Command of
Soviet Forces in the GDR may take measures to eliminate
it in consultation with the GDR government and with due
80
regard to the situation arising and to measures taken by
the state authorities of the GDR. [Ref. 103]
What this means is that the Commander-in-Chief of the SGFG
can declare a state of emergency throughout the country
whenever he likes. East German writers dispute the conclu-
sion that this article abrogates the sovereignty of the GDR
by making it completely dependent on the Soviet Union. They
say the "independence and sovereignty for a socialist state
mean above ail independence of (from) capitalism, and the
people's right to establish socialism and communism."
[Ref. 104]
The actual presence of Soviet representatives in mili-
tary organizations of the GDR is most pervasive. The repre-
sentative of the WTO Supreme Command in the GDR has his
office in the GDR Ministry for National Defense. Through
him the authority of the WTO is exercised in matters of
planning, logistics, standardization, and exercises. From
the regimental level upwards, Soviet and NVA commanders
regularly work together to prepare exercises and maneuvers,
which have increased significantly since 1969.
Additionally, there are some 80 Soviet staff officers also
present in the GDR Defense Ministry, and a Soviet general is
usually present at high-level NVA meetings, and copies of
the plans and proposals developed in these and other meet-
ings routinely go to the Soviet military mission in the GDR.
[Ref. 105]
While some of the GDR politicians might have liked to
see complete integration of the GDR military with the
Soviets, (at one time Gen. Hoffman supported a Soviet mili-
tary presence down to the battalion level) practical experi-
ence suggests that it is not possible. After 1969 there was
apparently a campaign started to increase contact and
comradeship between the GDR soldiers and the Soviet
"regiment next door," with the ultimate objective being to
increase the loyalty of the II VA to the USSR and to create
conditions for more effective integration in wartime.
However, a statement by GDR Defense Minister Hoffman in a
April 1974 editorial in Mil it a er we sen indicated that "coop-
eration with the Soviet comrades in daily military life does
not lead spontaneously to a new stage of internationalist
thought and action." [Hef. 106] In interviews with former
East German officers the following observation were made:
We trained together with the Russians at the regiment
level. We have already said that the training was very
hard in the NVA. However, when we trained together witn
the Russians. we saw how hard the Russians trained (and
that} we still had it much better.... For example, we
saw in the Schwarzwald how 127 Soviet soldiers slept in
one room— 127 who had no individual lockers but just a
tiny night drawer where they kept their uniforms. One
could say that what was valid for the Prussians earlier
is also certainly valid for the Soviets, that he who has
sworn allegiance to the Soviet flag once cannot hope to
preserve his individuality. This is a problem of which
(the authorities) should be careful because in the final
analysis it has led to a certain distance between the
NVA and the Soviet army which was not there ten years
before. This is for the simple reason that in the
Soviet soldier's consciousness certain doubts and
conflicts have developed after he has seen how the NVA
soldier lives within nis barracks, what riyhts he has as
a person in the army^ etc. As political deputies we
were especially conrronted with this problem. One
aspect of the (German-Russian) military competition
dealt with joint work and cooperation with the Soviet
unit, and yet the political deputies of the Soviet army
very often were reluctant to participate and not inter-
ested in meetings between Soviet soldiers and soldiers
of the NVA simply because the differences and contra-
dictions would then come out in the open and that had
negative consequences within the Soviet army.
[Ref. 107]
Another commented that such contacts "naturally led to envy,
especially when the simple Soviet soldier who sees that the
German who was defeated (in the war) lives much better than
he does (and finds it hard) to regard the Germans as
brother-in-arms- " And still another observed:
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We had a group of Soviet soldiers on one occasion
invited to our barracks and one could see in the faces
of the soldiers how surprised they were when they saw
our lockers and equipment, everything that we had. They
simply could not understand that. Then we sat down to
eat at tables that were covered with white tablecloths;
everybody had a complete dinner set with the respective
parts, prates, a cake plate, a salad bowl, etc. The
Russians just sat at the tabre and didn't dare to touch
anything, let alone eat, until the political deputy
ordered them in a loud voice to start eating.
[Eef. 108]
In addition to these reasons, the problem with language
skills also discouraged integration below the divisional
level. While NVA officers are sometimes able to use Russian
effectively, the majority of their troops cannot.
Another factor to consider in the integration problem is
the fact that while the SED is not completely viewed as
having a legitimate right to rule by many Germans, at least
they are Germans. Opposition tc the extensive militarism of
the German society is widespread enough without making it
appear that the German military is in fact controlled by
foreigners. In this regard, the SED has begun to stress the
GDR's "progressive" military tradition. But this is not
enough; there needs to be a link with actual German tradi-
tions. It is difficult for the SED to produce a consistent
historical picture of the Geraan past since it claims to
have broken with it, and since it espouses the view that
only popular masses are capable of achieving historical
progress. Obviously a military tradition cannot be linked
to an anonymous mass, so the NVA has devised several head-
ings under which traditional German accomplishments can be
grouped
:
1. Glorious feats of arms in the service of progress
2. Great soldiers and military politicians
3. Exemplary socialist fighting groups
4. Exemplary NVA units
5. German-Russian brotherhood-in-arms
6. Socialist brotherhood-in-arms. [ Ref . 109]
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Having discussed the NVA in general terms, it will now
he useful to look in detail at the structure and eguipment
of the 1984 NVA , as well as discussing its mission and
training- Table III shows the composition of the NVA.
While it is not the smallest of the WTO armies, it is the
smallest of the crucial Northern Tier armies with 167,000
total troops, of which over half (92,000) are conscripts who
serve 18 months in the Army and Air Force and 36 months in
the Navy. And while it does not have the most modern of the
Soviet equipment, it is as well equipped as the other
Northern Tier states, having such items as the T-72 medium
tank, the BMP-1 armored personnel carrier, (See Military
section of the previous chapter.) and the SAQ-122. As in
Czechoslovakia and Poland, it also has an airborne
battalion.
What is the mission of the forces of the NVA in case of
a war with NATO? Since 1967 the NVA has been incorporated
into the first strategic echelon of the WTO. This means its
forces would be immediately involved in combat operations.
The army will either fight separately as a national army
group or be assigned to higher Soviet formations which will
march on to West German territory. The navy, together with
the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the Polish Navy, will have the
task of securing the coastal flank of the invading communist
armies and provide support from the sea, including amphib-
ious operations and logistic aid. The air force, which is
totally integrated into the WTO air defense network, would
be used almost exclusively in that capacity. Under some
circumstances, it could also give limited support to the
land offensive. [Ref. 110]
Combat training for the NVA corresponds closely to that
provided to the Soviet army. Procedures and eguipment are
standardized. At the divisional level and below, the logis-
tics system is the responsibility of the N^A [Ref. 111].
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TABLE III
German Democratic Republic, 1984
Population: 16,760,000
Military Service: Army, Air Force--13 months
Navy (sea-going)— 36 months
Total regular forces: 167,000 (92,000 conscript)
ARMY: 116,000 j[69,000 conscr.)
2 Military Dists. , 2 Army
Headquarters
2 tank div. (Cat. I)
4 mot. rifle div- (Cat. I)
2 SSM brgd. with Scud
2 artillery rgmts.
2 antiartillery rgmts.
2 air defense rgmts. w/SA-4s
3 signals regiments
3 engineering regiments






1,00 BDRM-T/2 scout cars
1,500 armored pers. carriers
24 Frog-7, 18 Scud-B SSMs
AT-3 Sagger, AT-4 Spigot
ATGW, SA-4/6/7/9 SAMs
AIR FORCE: 37.000 (15,000 con.)
359 combat acft, 30 armed helos
2 air divisions:
6 air defense rgmts-— 300 MiG-
21F/23S
4 fighter squads w/MiG-17/
23s
1 reccnn. squads. w/MiG-21s
7 SAM regiments w/SA-2/3s
2 radar regiments
1 transport regiment
2 helo. rgmts w/Mi-2/3/8/24s
AAMs: AA-2 Atoll
ASMs: AT-3 Sagger ATGw
NAVY: 14,000 (8,000 conscr. )
5 combat helicopters
2 Rostock frigates w/
SA-N-4 SAMs
9 Parchim corvettes w/
SA-N-5 SAMS
15 Osa-1 FAC(M) w/Stvx
48 FAC(T): 18 Shershen,
30 Libelle























Units (10, 500) —






Source: Military Balance 1983/84, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, London; reprinted in
Air Force Magazine,
December, 7983", p7 8 0.
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The core of the training program is the simulation of
fightirg under war conditions, with ail the exertion and
privations involved. On longer exercises the units take all
their military equipment with them as a test of mobility and
combat-readiness. Prime importance is placed on maneuver-
ability. Long marches, motorized or on foot, day and night,
in fair weather or foul, are characteristic of these exer-
cises, practicing the following basic scenarios:
1. Stopping an attack launched across the state frontier
2. Counterattacking into "Aggressor-land"
3. Destroying "diversionary" troops and parachutists."
The previously mentioned missions of the navy and the air
force condition the type of training each receives. They
are both trained on a much s nailer scale than the army.
[Ref. 112]
Before one can make a final evaluation of the reli-
ability of the GDR armed forces, it is necessary to examine
two other aspects: political control and prof essionaliza-
tion (i.e. technical qualification) . From the very outset
of the establishment of the NVA, GDR (and Soviet) politi-
cians decided that they were prepared to take whatever steps
were necessary to make sure that the East German military
remained firmly under Party control. During the mid-
sixties, with the introduction of the New Economic System,
it was decided that the ideal NVA officer was one who was
both technically and politically qualified, as well as
actively engaged in party as well as technical activities
[Ref. 113]. In order to preclude the "strong feelings of
institutional identity, common interests, and exclusivist
professional attitudes" from combining with the "monopoly of
the means of violence" to breed "autonomy or political
assertiveness, " the Party* s system of political control in
the military had to be effective [Ref. 114]. This fact was
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in conflict with the need for the development of specific
military concerns. Nevertheless, the SED set out to achieve
such contradictory goals.
The first way to do this was to ensure that the polit-
ical officer was a qualified military man in his own right.
In theory, command authority in the NVA rests solely with
the military commander. In practice, however, his authority
is nominal because his second in command, the political
officer, is the head of a separate chain of command which
monitors the commander's decisions and has the power to
circumvent them in case of a disagreement between the two.
However, since the career of the political deputy depends as
much, and maybe even more, en the unit's performance in
military competition and achievement of standards as that of
the military commander, there is a powerful impetus for
cooperation and compromise. This tends to dilute party
control. Usually the political officers are drawn from the
ranks of the troops, NCOs, or officers and do not follow a
specifically political career track. One former officer,
who described his situation as typical, was first trained as
a technical officer in the air force, and , after having
served in that capacity for some years, was appointed as a
political officer [ Hef . 115]. Former NVA officers inter-
viewed by Robert Dean indicated that at least through the
rank of captain interchanging officers between military and
political functions was commonplace. [Ref. 116]
As far as professionalization goes, the original officer
corps of the NVA was inadequately prepared in a general
educational sense and severely deficient in technical mili-
tary training. Between 1962 and 1964, many officers were
forced to leave the service because they could not qualify
in technical, administrative, and teaching skills
[Ref. 117], By 1969 all officers were required to pass
standardized examinations in three separate areas: a
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military-technical specialty, administration and political
education (sufficient to qualify as a county party secre-
tary) , and an equivalent civilian profession, usually a
teacher or an engineer [Ref. 118].
One of the most attractive aspects of a military career
is the access it provides to the middle and higher echelons
of the state and party apparatus. While there are no
figures to indicate the percentage of officers who make this
move, former NVA officers describe such a career pattern as
typical. Since promotion within the armed forces depends
upon the party, the officer's pclitical reliability has been
carefully scrutinized during his entire career. Another
inducement to a military career is the fact that there is
considerable prestige attached to the profession of military
officers in the GDR (at least from the official organiza-
tions). Therefore the pay and benefits that go along with a
military career are substantial, tending to minimize and
conflict with civilian authorities over these matters.
[Ref. 119]
Theoretically, the more professional, i.e. technically
oriented, the military is the less likely they will be
interested in political questions, other than those that
concern their specific needs (salaries, weapons systems,
etc.). However, it also appears that the more technically
oriented the military is, the less it wants to waste time
with political indoctrination. And in the final evaluation,
would the Soviet Union trust an army that was technically
superior, but politically ignorant or indifferent? Not
likelyl The question is how successful has the SED been in
combining these two aspects. The results of Dale
Herspring's study through 1972 show that they had consider-
able success up to that time [Ref. 120]. Robert Dean's
research (finalized in 1980) indicated, however that the more
specialization occured, the less politically inclined the
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NVA soldiers have become, especially in the faca of detente.
As the head of the Party Central Committee Security
Department observed:
In the implementation of our policy of peaceful coexis-
tence, the class fronts and the class enemy are not
always immediately recognizable for young Party members
and especially for young army members. It is sometimes
difficult for these young people to recognize the
connections between the struggle for peaceful coexis-
tence, strengthening of the mlitary power of socialism
and tne struggle against the imperialist system and to
draw conclusions from this for their work. [Ref- 121]
These factors notwithstanding, it seems that the GDE has
succeeded in creating an officer corps that has a substan-
tial degree of commitment to its policies (and thus, by
implication to the Soviet Union.).
D. THE GDfi IN THE WTO
The integration of the GDE into the WTO has already been
mentioned in several places. From the very beginning of
their participation in the WTC, the GDE has used joint
maneuvers to display German-Soviet "brotherhood-in-arms" in
practice. The GDE participated in at least 27 ground
forces/combined arms exercises in this period. Of these, 7
were held exclusively on German territory, 9 completely
outside of their territory, and 11 jointly on GDE and Polish
or Czechoslovak territory.
That this has been successful and has inspired Soviet
confidence in the GDE is evidenced by the fact that GDE
Defense Minister and NVA Commander, Gen. Heinz Hoffman, has
been given the opportunity of commanding no less than three
of the major joint WTO exercises--"Quartet " in 1963,
"Erotherhood of Arms" in 1970, and "Autumn Storm" in 1971— a
distinction not given to other non-Soviet WTO commanders
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[Ref. 122]. In addition, they always try to establish a
direct link between these exercises and the elimination of
international crises. Thus, the land exercises being
conducted at the time of the building of the Barlin Wall in
1961 were characterized as "mounting a reliable guard and
effective control over the GDR's frontiers with West Berlin
and the Federal Republic," which "frustrated an act of
aggression against the GDR planned by the West German impe-
rialists," smashing "an attempt by cevanchiste adventurers
to incorporate our socialist state in the NATO power-bloc
and resolutely prevented what night have been a worldwide
conflagration." [Bef. 123] And in 1965 anti-Western propa-
ganda was increased before the announcement of the large
"Oktobersturm" exercise naming Bonn as "the main enemy, an
aggressive power only waiting to cross the border by force
of arms." [Ref. 124 ]
GDR participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia was
also explained in terms of a crisis— "counter-revolution" to
whose "deadly threat" socialism in Czechoslovakia would have
succumbed if it were it not for the fraternal assistance of
the five WTO countries. However, German occupation troops
were removed shortly after the invasion because the troops,
at the admission of the commanders could no longer be relied
upon to suppress the population. GDR troops were soon only
allowed to move around at night because Czechoslovak public
opinion saw their presence as a repeat of Hitler^ occupa-
tion in 1938/39. Another, and probably moire important,
reason for their removal, in the minds of the Soviets
anyway, was the fact that many Czechs were familiar with the
situation in Germany and spoke German. Too many
German-Czech discussions would damage the Soviet's cause.
£Ref. 125]
Another aspect indicating the degree of reliability with
which the Soviets view the GDB is its increasing military
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cooperation with the Third World- Since 1972, the GDE has
taken over much of the "proxy" assistance that had previ-
ously been provided by Czechoslovakia, including the pres-
ence of technicians and military advisors as well as
providing arms. Indeed, in this area the GDR in recent
years has played a more active role than any of its WTO
counterparts [fief- 126]. By 1977, 22 African and Middle
East states had received aid frcm the GDR either in the form
of arms (Morocco, Mali, Ghana, Libya, Lebanon, North Yemen,
Behrein) , arms and training (Algeria, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Nigeria, Somalia, South Yemen, Syria, Irag) , or technical
assistance (Tanzania, India, Lacs, Angola) . And East German
representatives were present on Grenada prior to the
American intervention. Current figures from the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in London
indicate the strength of GDR forces stationed abroad as
follows: [Ref. 127]
Algeria - 250 Libya - 400
Angola - 450 Mozambique- 100
Ethiopia - 550 South Yemen - 75
Guinea - 125 Syria - 210
Iraa - 160
Thus, it appears that in spite of retention of Soviet
control in the WTO, 6 indicating lack of trust in its
"allies," the traditional GDR slavish adoption of Soviet
6 The reforms of 1969 appear to have been more show than
substance. The non-Soviet members have been consulted more,
but have hardly been given more decisionmaking authority.
In the military-operational aspects of the alliance, tne
Soviets still dominate the command structure, control the
alliance's nuclear warheads, and solely provide logistic
support in key areas such as communications, transport, and
supplies (except in Romania). Brown, p. 4 1.
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policies and programs has paid off in being accorded rela-
tively more trust than the other states by tne Soviet lead-
ership.
E. GDE PABTICIPATIOB IH COMECON
The German Democratic Republic is the most highly indus-
trialized and technologically advanced country in the Soviet
bloc. It is, however, a "processing" economy; that is, it
imports raw materials and exports finished products because
it is highly deficient in basic industrial raw materials.
Aside from low-grade coal and potash, most of its raw
materials must be imported--some 8055 of its high-grade coal,
96 % of its crude oil, 97% of its iron ore, and all of its
bauxite, chromium, manganese, and phosphate, as well as
large quantities of chemicals, cotton, lumber, and grain.
Even its water supply is barely adequate for its needs
£Ref. 128]. Some 25-30% of its gross domestic product must
be exported to pay for these basic materials. The country
is also suffering from a labcr shortage and aging plant
facilities with very little excess capacity.
As in Czechoslovakia, the inefficiencies inherent in
centrally planned economies are currently affecting German
productivity. In an attempt tc combat these problems, the
GDR government has begun a program of concentrating invest-
ments in modernization and retooling rather than in building
new plants. Additionally they have made great strides in
introducing industrial robots into the manufacturing
process. There were official reports of 13,000 robots being
installed in 1981, but the figures could be somewhat
misleading since there seems to be a discrepancy in the
definition of an industrial robot [ Ref . 129]. In 1979 they
also began a two-stage restructuring of the industrial
organizations and Foreign Trade Enterprises (FTEs)
,
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representing, perhaps, the most fundamental change in the
industrial and commercial organization in almost 20 years.
Theoretically this reorganization should make GDR industry
more flexible and more responsive to world market condi-
tions. Improvement is expected in terms of quality, price,
style, the level of technological and design sophistication,
and timely delivery of GDR products to foreign markets
[Ref. 130]. Whether this restructuring will accomplish the
goals set for it remains to be seen.
The GDR has substantial commitments to the COMECON coun-
tries. In the early years after World War II, the GDR was
almost totally dependent upon the Soviet Union. And in
attempting to become a faithful ally, and thus ensure its
continued independent existence, the GDR also traded almost
exclusively with other communist countries. Today some 80S
of the GDR's highly reputed photographic and optical goods,
which could earn it much-needed hard currency, must still be
shipped to other communist bloc countries. It also needs
high levels of fuel--particularly oil—and is almost totally
dependent on the Soviet Union for its supplies. This
increases the already substantial political pressure to
conform to Soviet wishes.
However, there are also significant pressures to
increase trade with the West, particularly West Germany,
which would increase the influence of Western ideas in the
last. The SDR government has made a commitment to the
continued increase in the standard of living for its people,
and it recognizes that to accomplish tnis, it must expand
trade and industrial cooperation with the West. The 1981-85
five year plan gives hiy h priority to technology and
machinery from the West. This includes automation equip-
ment, computers, industrial robots, electronic controls, and
chemical and metallurgical plants. It expects to pay for
these imports by expanding "counter trade;" that is, by
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supplying Western customers with compensating amounts of
steel, chemicals, fertilizers, plastics, and limited amounts
of high-precision optical eguipaent. [Ref. 131]
The prospects for the continued high growth of the GDR
economy are highly doubtful at this point. The main prob-
lems are those of the increasing energy and raw materials
prices, the fact that oil supplies will not increase as
needed for general economic expansion, and the GDE's
external debt--both hard currency and with the other COMECON
countries. The GDE's hard currency debt is higher than any
other COMECON country except Poland. The need to service
this heavy debt will preclude using extensive Western
credits to generate further economic expansion.
Additionally the fact that the East German labor force
cannot be significantly increased is another limiting
factor. One last factor—increased military expenditures-
could also become a problem. The members of the Warsaw
Treaty Organization have so far resisted the Soviet pressure
to increase their military budget, but GDR leaders have made
it clear that they must respond in kind to Western military
spending, regardless of the impact on their other objec-
tives. They already maintain a significantly higher mili-
tary budget than other WTO countries. [Ref. 132] There was
one significant exception to this position, however. When
the Soviets informed their allies that it would deploy more
SS-20s in Czechoslovakia and East Germany to counter the new
Pershing II threat, both countries took the unusual option
of formally and openly opposing that move. According to
L 1 Express sources, that would have required East Germany to
increase its military budget by some 17%, which it felt it
could not afford. [Ref. 133]
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17- POLAND
Despite its obviously reluctant participation in the
Communist system, Poland is the third member of the crucial
"Northern Tier" of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO)
,
that along with Czechoslovakia and the GDR, represent not
only the buffer between the Soviet anion and the West, but
also the most highly industrialized and militarily advanced
countries within the Soviet empire.
A. POLISH POLITICAL CDLTDSE
Polish political culture can be described as encom-
passing individualism, romanticism, social formality, Polish
nationalism, patriotism, Catholicism, a preference for
Western ideas, and a strong dislike of authority of any kind
[Eef. 134]. As with any culture, these characteristics are
formed by the country's history. More perhaps than other
countries in the Eastern bloc, it is impossible to under-
stand Poland without knowing sonething of its history. One
Polish historian explains it as follows:
Poland has been troubled by a history in which myth is
as potent a brew to the Polish imagination as fact.
There is not an event in our current travails that
cannot find some echo in our history. But because that
history is constantly distorted by the authorities, it
is also distorted in a completely different way by the
public. Because the Party is so terrified by the past,
ordinary people cling to it with a passion that is
terrifying. We have become a people who can live only
in the imagination of what we believe to be the glorious
past. [Ref. 135]
From the 15th through the 17th centuries the kingdom of
Poland stretched from the Baltic in the north, including
Prussia, to the Black Sea in the south, and to within 200
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miles of the gates of Moscow, becoming a permanent threat to
the state of Muscovy. It had three fatal characteristics
that continue to plague the state today: a lack of natural
borders, a geographic position at the center of the conti-
nent, and the inability of its people to agree among
themselves—even when foreign aggression threatened their
very existence. The Polish empire also had a kind of democ-
racy long before other countries of the world. Their king
was elected by the gentry, and his power was further limited
by the parliament, made up of members of the gentry from
each region. Each member had an absolute veto over the
proceedings and could dissolve the Sejm (parliament) with
his vote, thus nullifying all acts passed during that
session. Usually members objected to new taxes to fight a
new war, but often invading armies bribed a member of
Parliament to weaken Poland's ability to defend itself.
In 1772, Catherine the Great of Russia, using the
supposed persecution of the Russian Orthodox churches by the
Polish Catholics as an excuse, invaded Poland luring one of
its periodic periods of paralysis due to infighting in the
Sejm. In order that Russia not become too powerful, Austria
and Prussia also moved in. With most of its members bribed
by one of the three nations, the Sejm voted in favor of the
First Partition. About 30% of Poland was carved up among
the three powers, leaving it with borders even more diffi-
cult to defend and a bitter and divided population.
[Eef. 136]
Eealizing too late what their inability to agree had
done to their country, a group of gentry was determined to
see that that did not happen again. They voted in a new
constitution, the second in the world, which was modelled
closely on the American example. If allowed to go unchal-
lenged, however, this new government coula have been
dangerous to Poland's neighbors, possibly destabilizing
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their regimes with similar demands. Once again, in collu-
sion with Sejm members whose pcwer depended upon preserving
the old ways, Catherine brought the conservatives to St.
Petersburg where they signed an "Act of Confederation" with
Russia, and called for Russian troops to put down the
liberals. On 18 May 1792, the Russian army crossed Poland's
borders for a second time. T«ith Russia and Prussia both
grabbing huge sections of Poland, it was partitioned for the
second time. The concept of Poland as a buffer state was
introduced at this time, calling the remaining land "a
barrier between the powers.
"
Two years later, Tadeusz Kosciuszko, leading an army of
peasants, demanded national self-rule, abolition of the
monarchy, equal civil rights for ail citizens, freedom for
the peasantry, and a limited franchise based on property
qualification. They fought both Russia and Prussia, and
despite several victories won against tremendous odds, the
Poles were finally defeated and tneir leaders fled, prima-
rily to France. The Third Partition of Poland then
occurred, reflecting the desire Df Austria, Prussia, and
Russia to "wipe this troublesome nation off the map."
[Ref. 137]
The next 120 years, until Poland obtained its indepen-
dence in 1918, set the moid of current Polish character.
The people were determined that even though their state had
been destroyed, that their culture would survive. In 1815
the Congress of Vienna ratified the partitions, but estab-
lished the tiny kingdom of Warsaw as a sop to Polish pride,
and then proceeded to put it under the control of the Czar.
In 1830, young men from the School of Cadets in Warsaw rose
up against the Czar and held out for a year. Then in 1863,
the people rose up again, albeit with no leaders and no
expectations of victory. The Russians reacted predictably:
they erased the name of the kingdom of Warsaw from the maps,
97
made the use of the Russian language mandatory in govern-
ment, business, and schools, and took the land away from the
Polish nobility. Prussia followed suit, also attempting to
eradicate all vestiges of Polish influence and culture
[fief- 138]. Only in the Habsburg portion of Polish terri-
tory were the Poles and their culture allowed to exist
without prejudice.
Had it not been for the ceaseless attempts by the
Catholic church to keep the Polish language, lore, and
literature alive after the partitions, Polish culture would
probably have been eradicated [ Bef . 139]. Additionally, the
Church acquired a quasi-political role, as it had during the
twelfth century when national integration had been threat-
ened by lack of internal cohesion and German expansionism.
In the absence of a nationally accepted monarch, the Pope
acted as head of state and maintained national unity. Also
the fact that the two most aggressive partition
powers—Prussia and Russia—represented Protestantism and
Orthodoxy, respectively, made it easy for the Poles to iden-
tify Catholicism with Polish nationality. [Ref. 140]
One other crucial factor in the development of the
Polish political culture must be mentioned: the Poles'
obsessive attachment to the land. Up to the fifteenth
century, during Poland's tenure as a great power, it served
as the "breadbasket" of Europe, wheat being the source of
the wealth of the nation. By the time of the First
Partition, the Poles realized that wealth through trade and
manufacturing had gone to the foreigners, leaving them
increasingly pauperized in their own country. But dealing
with money was still considered beneath contempt and leaving
the land was viewed as surrendering one's birthright, so
they stayed where they were, becoming poorer and poorer with
each generation. Today, this attachment to the land, which
thwarts the Communist Party's agricultural collectivization
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efforts, still represents a clinging to a semi-noble
heritage from the glorious past- [ Bef - 14 1]
As a result of the previously outlined factors, Poland
entered the modern period with a perception that they were a
unique and separate nation, geographically isolated from
their friends, and in constant need of defending themselves
against potential enemies
—
particularly the Soviet Union and
Germany. They clung to their "glorious" past and dreamed of
regaining some of that greatness [Ref. 142]. Samuel Sharp
sums up their attitude toward government:
For more than a century, Poles had learned to look upon
government as alien and hostile; for centaries before,
they had cultivated active disrespect for government.
The fatherland was more often looked upon as a source of
privileges, not as responsibility. The population was
suspicious of government to the point of not cooperating
on any but extreme occasions. [Ref. 143]
Poland officially received its independence in 1913 at
the conclusion of World War I, although its boriers were not
officially drawn until 1923. Independence did not bring the
power so long hoped for by the Polish people. Once again
the inability to agree among themselves destroyed any hope
for concerted national action. It could hardly have been
otherwise, though. Poland became independent with six
currencies, four official Army languages, eighteen regis-
tered political parties, railway gauges of different sizes,
three legal codes, three distinct codes of social behavior,
and regions with adninistrations separate from the central
authority (such as the industrially important Silesia) . The
truth was that for all its longing for independence, Poland
was simply unprepared to cope with it on:e it came.
[Ref. 144]
Poland was only allowed twenty years to refine its
political system before the rise of Hitler and yet another
partition. The traditional enmity between the Poles and the
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Germans and the Russians was magnified geometrically by
"world War II. The Germans took the northern, southern, and
western parts of Poland, and the Soviet Union the eastern
part. Conditions were equally as harsh under both occupa-
tion systems. British historian Norman Davies concluded
that at that point the Soviet Onion was trying to prevent
the resurrection of an independent Poland in any form what-
soever. The Poles were saved by the German attack on Russia
in 1941, after which Stalin declared amnesty for Polish
prisoners. However, once the fighting was over, the
remnants of the Polish army who had been hunted by the
Germans were then hunted by the Russians. The war had
taught Poland a lesson similar to the one learned by
Czechoslovakia: that they would receive no help from the
West. Whatever they achieved wculd be achieved by their own
efforts. The stage was set for resistance to Soviet domina-
tion, a fact that has not changed to this day.
B. THE GGVERN3EHT
Stalin was not likely to let Poland go its own way after
the war, and when Russian tanks liberated Poland from German
occupation in 1944, the Communist Party came in with them.
The Party represented only a tiny fraction of the Polish
population, but it guickly massed considerable support in
spite of the traditional animosity. It became obvious very
guickly that the Stalinist-supported Communists were not
going to hand over power to the legal government in exile in
London, recognized by all Western powers, or even tc a
coalition of national factions. The elections of January
1947 were rigged in favor of the "Democratic" bloc--
controlled by the Communists. As in other countries, all
leftist factions were forcefully united into one party which




The new government moved quickly to consolidate its
power throughout the country, with the help of five groups
of people. The first was army officers and professionals
who had been compromised in the past and could be black-
mailed. The second was prewar civil servants, many of whom
really believed that cooperation with a Soviet-approved
government was the only hope for Poland. The third was the
prewar socialist parties; the fourth was Poles with totali-
tarian tendencies; and the fifth was a group of prewar
socialist politicians who had been won over by the
Communists. [ Bef . 146]
With that less than auspicious beginning, it is still
necessary to examine a little further the early actions of
the Communist Party in Poland in order to understand the
deep-rooted antipathy and resentment that axists today
between the Party and the people. While the eastern half of
Poland was still part of the Russian empire (prior to 1918),
the Polish contingent was an important part of the illegal
Eussian Bolshevik Party, whose members thought of themselves
as much Russian as Polish. More importantly, they consid-
ered themselves part of the international proletariat,
regarding such concepts as nationhood outmoded and bour-
geois, and when the time came after World War I for Polish
sovereignty to be restored, the Communist Party opposed that
move. To the Poles, this was treason. Then, in spite of
the fact that Stalin expelled the Polish Party from the
Comintern, arrested those members living in exile in Russia,
executed many, and sent the rest to prison camps, they still
looked to Russia for leadership in 1939, and welcomed them
as liberators and brothers when the Germans invaded. The
fact that the Russians sat on the other side of the river
doing nothing while the Germans obliterated Warsaw also has
never been forgotten.
101
The Communist Party was rehabilitated after the German
invasion of Russia in 1941, but Stalin established his own
front organization in Moscow, which quickly found itself at
odds with what was left of the eld Party. Once the war was
over a struggle developed between the Muscovites, who sought
to implant a Stalinist regime using the power of the Red
Army, and the Home group led by Wladyslaw Gomulka, who advo-
cated the Polish road to socialism. By 1948, the
Muscovites, led by Boleslaw Bierut, an active NKVD agent,
were strong enough to move against the Home group, expelling
Gomulka and placing him under house arrest, where he
remained for eight years.
The Communist Party, thus, has always been regarded as a
foreign government— imposed and with no popular mandate. It
has always been on the defensive and has never known
anything but antagonism and hostility from the people. The
psychological effect has been profound. Forming tight
little groups which, for the most part avoided non-Party
members, the Communists came to think of themselves as an
elite, whose special association with the "course of
history" exempted them from the rules of ordinary society.
They felt themselves to be a group of special people
deserving special privileges, whose increasing distance from
the reality of existence in Poland led ultimately to their
downfall in 1956,1970, and 1980. [Ref. 147]
The great majority of the Poles agreed that the primary
task of the nation after World War II was to unite around a
leadership and find a way to get the country moving again.
They had no serious objection to nationalization of the
basic means of production, i.e. industry. But they balked
at collectivization of agriculture, still feeling strongly
about the right of the individual to own land [Ref. 149].
As with other Communist countries, the majority of the
economic investment was channelled into industry. The
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additional demands placed on the Polish economy by the
increased military spending for the Korean War severely
disrupted the Six Year Plan in existence at that time. The
economic costs of integration into the Soviet system during
this period were tremendous. Forced coal deliveries to the
Soviet Onion (at prices much lower than what they could have
obtained in the West) were continued. The quality of
machinery and goods they received in return was inferior,
and many orders from the West were lost because of Soviet
monopolization of the export capacity of certain plants.
The one saving grace was that these enormous costs were not
known to the bulk of the people, or even many intellectuals
and Party members. [Hef. 150]
After the death of Stalin in 1953, the Polish people
were slowly growing demoralized and disillusioned about the
ability of the communist government to fulfill its promises
and satisfy the needs of the nation. Then with the Swiatlo
revelations 7 and Khrushcnev's anti-Stalin speech in February
1956, Party and public morale declined even more rapidly.
In June, the suppressed frustration of the people manifested
itself in a peaceful march, led by Party members, in Poznar.
demanding higher wages and an improvement in the general
standard of living. It quickly turned into a riot lasting
two days, which required the combined forces of the police
and security forces backed up by tanks to control it.
[Ref. 151] The Central Committee and the Politburo met and
decided that Wladysiaw Gomulka, still officially in
disgrace, was the only person who could salvage the
situation.
7 lt. Col. Swiatlo of the Polish Secret Police defected
to the West and broadcast over Voice of America the full
extent of the Soviet control over Poland and of the activi-
ties of the secret police.
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For a satellite country to appoint its * own First
Secretary without suggestion or approval from the Kremlin
was unheard of, and as soon as the Soviets became aware of
it, they decided they had to act. Marshal Eokossowski, a
Polish-born Soviet citizen and commander-in-chief of Polish
forces, was ordered to put Soviet troops stationed in Poland
on alert. Without the knowledge of the Polish Politburo, he
was told to march on Warsaw, but Polish officers, observing
the troop movements, informed Eokossowski that the Army
supported Gomulka and would fight if necessary to protect
his position (in contrast to Czechoslovak actions under
similar circumstances. Shortly afterward, a surprised
Polish Politburo received word that a Soviet airliner
carrying the entire top Soviet leadership, led by Nikita
Khrushchev, was asking permission to land. During the
initial stormy meeting, Gomulka reportedly turned to
Khrushchev and said if the troop movements were not halted
immediately, he would inform the Polish people what was
happening. He refused to negotiate under that threat. That
was the first time the Soviets were forced to concede
actions in Poland that they would not tolerate in other
satellite countries. [Ref. 152]. Khrushchev himself
described the strength of the Polish resistance as follows:
Marshal Konev and I held separate consultations with
Comrade Eokossovsky.. . . He told us that anti-Soviet,
nationalistic, and reactionary forces were growing in
strength, and that if it were necessary to arrest the
growth of these counterrevolutionary elements bv force
of arms. he was at our disposal, ... That was all very
well and good, but as we began to analyze the problem in
more detail and calculate which Polish regiments we
could count on to obey Eokossovsky, the situation began
to look somewhat bleak. Of course, our own armed
strength far exceeded that of Poland, out we didn't want
to resort to the use of our cwn troops if at all avoi-
dable. On the other hand. we didn't want Poland to
become a bourgeois country hostile to the Soviet Union.
[Ref. 153]
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With the rise of Gomulka to power, the autonomy of
enterprises and their managers was considerably increased,
the workers 1 councils that had sprung up spontaneously were
legalized, land was substantially decollec tivized and
markets somewhat reactivated. Ey 1958, however, with polit-
ical control restored, it became obvious that Gomulka was
not a democrat in communist clothing, so to speak, and a
period of re-centralization began. The reforms had made
life somewhat more tolerable, however, and the fact that
Poland was going to remain a part of the Soviet system for a
long time was easier to accept. The Hungarian revolt and
the subsequent Soviet invasion, coupled with the West's
inability and/or unwillingness to intervene, reinforced that
realization.
The government became increasingly illiberal— retreating
from attempts at institutional innovation, discouraging
genuine participation in the system and promoting closer
ties with the Soviet Union. A lember of Gomulka's staff
offered a reason for this:
Gomulka became convinced from the moment he took power--
perhaps it was something Khrushchev had said when he
arrived in such a rage— that Russia was prepared to
settle the continuing problems of European security and
Germany at the expense of Poland. His constant night-
mare was that Poland's Western territories, which he had
administered when they fell into Poland's hands at the
end of the war, wouid be returned to Germany under an
overall general peace settlement. He believed that if
he stepped out of line again, then that would be what
the Russians would do. [Kef. 154]
As the society grew more rigid and the economy stagnated in
the 1960s (Polish workers received the lowest increase in
salaries of all East European countries.) , tensions rose.
The lack of legitimacy of the Gomulka government was
becoming apparent when it had to resort to brute force in
1968 during the student revolts. These resulted in anti-
intellectual and anti-Semitic purges in the government and
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military, followed two years later by the riots in Gdansk
and other northern industrial areas over a drastic increase
in food prices [Eef. 155]. When it became obvious in 1970
that Gomulka was no longer in control of the situation,
another leader acceptable to both Moscow and the Polish
people had to be found, or the possibility of Soviet inter-
vention could have become a reality.
Edward Gierek took over the reigns of the Ccmmunist
Party in 1971, and he understood the basic problems of the
Polish economy. He is an example of Jack Bielasiak's
"coopted" leader— that is, one who has spent more than six
years in a specialized vocation before coming to a govern-
ment position [Eef. 156]. He was not a "Moscow" man or even
a true Home communist, having spent many years in the coal
mines of France and Belgium. He only returned to Poland in
1948 with the reputation for efficient management and for
securing high wages for his workforce. He was known as a
strong man of independent views who allowed no interference
in his province of Silesia, which he governed as First
Secretary for 13 years [Eef. 157]. His approach to Polish
problems was one of cautious reform--of the economy, of the
Party, and of state administration [Eef- 158]. It seemed
that professional competence was to gain predominance over
ideological commitment— a phase the GDE entered in the
middle sixties.
Gierek 1 s new economic package was directed to the goal
of intensive development--that is, to achieving high produc-
tivity and efficiency.
By 1975, however, the failure of his economic strategy
became clear to the people. When they were allowed no more
say in the matter than they had had before, the attempt to
increase the food prices in 1976, caused another uprising.
Not wishing a repeat of the 1970 riots which overthrew
Gomulka, Gierek backed down.
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Once the government reversed its decision on the prices,
there seems to have teen no mere official economic policy
making. [Ref. 159]. By 1979, the service on Poland 1 s
foreign debt amounted to 94% of the value of its exports on
a debt that was over $20 billion [Ref. 160], Something had
to be done to relieve the pressure on the economy.
This was basically the state of affairs at the time of
the next attempt at food price increases in August 1980
which resulted in the formation of Solidarity.
Bread-and-butter issues,however , took second place to the
demands for fundamental political change [Ref. 161]. And
Solidarity won— for a while.
That they succeeded in a leasure beyond their wildest
hopes was due to four major factors: {^) The political
leadership was unable to resist strong demands. (2) The
large branch ministries, interested only in increasing their
own power, put steady pressure on governmental economic
decision. (3) Wage demands were continuous, strong, and
irresistible. (4) The interaction of the first three
factors produced an economic deterioration which the leader-
ship could not combat because it refused to communicate
through popular opinion channels. [Ref. 162]
The problems leading up to martial law in December 1981
were almost identical to those leading to the military take-
over by Marshal Pilsudski in 1926— the inability to agree
among themselves. The Party was impotent, and Solidarity
never resolved the basic problem of whether it should remain
an outside pressure group or take some responsibility for
actually running the collapsing economy. Nor could the
members decide on an acceptanle pace of reforms.
With the declaration of martial law, the Communist world
experienced another anomaly— military control over the
country. Poland was bankrupt, unable to honor its interna-
tional debts without substantial aid from the Soviet Union,
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and was governed by a Party frcm which the people had with-
drawn all support. The situation could not be much worse
from the point of view of the Soviets. There were not many
options left to them short of actual invasion, which would
result in massive resistance from the population, and
possibly the armed forces. Since Jaruzelsjci is Moscow's
man, as nearly as his impeccable record can measure loyalty,
it would seem that military control was the lesser of the
evils. The economy is not out cf trouble yet, but the situ-
ation seems to have stabilized and is making halting prog-
ress.
The situation may have stabilized for the moment, but
after a taste of democracy— or at least participation in
their government— the Poles will certainly try again to rid
themselves of an imposed government. According to Stewart
Steven,
For the moment, maybe, the military believes it has
things under control. But for how long can it hold down
a population that has proved time and time again it is
prepared to fight for its rights? Resistance began on
the first day martial law was declared: that resistance
will gnaw away at the foundations of this regime as it
has every other, until it crumbles and onca again we
will face each other across the barricades, either that
or one day this government will eventually capitulate to
the will of the Polish people. No people, particularly
the Poles, can be kept down against their will forever.
December 1 98 1 was merely an interval in our affairs.
Those who know Poland know that it cannot be otherwise.
Those who know the Poles know that we will never settle
for second best. [Eef. 163]
C. THE MILITARY
One of the key aspects of reliability in wartime is
obviously the military. The Polish Army under General
Jaruzelski is not only the largest non-Soviet force in the
YiTO , but also one of the best trained and most professional.
Because Jaruzelski threw away the Communist "rulebook" in
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the early seventies, Polish officers are highly proficient
and motivated. With a program similar to that initiated in
the GDR, the emphasis was on professional competence
[Bef. 164]- Nevertheless, their willingness to fight the
West under any circumstance except an actual invasion of
their territory must he seriously questioned in view of what
has been presented before.
The origin of the Polish People's Army can be traced
primarily to the First and Second Polish Armies organized on
Soviet territory in 1943, and consisted mainly of Poles who
had fled the Nazi occupation. Both armies, however, were
dominated by Soviet officers, which, by the end of the war,
made up nearly one- third of the officer corps [Bef. 165].
In part, this was due to the lack of availability of Polish
officers, many of whom had been killed either by the Germans
or the Prussians. One particular incident that still rankles
with the Polish people today is the massacre in the forest
of Katyn in the spring of 1940. Evidence is overwhelming
that the Russian NKVD executed over 4,200 Polish officers,
and the Poles believe that this was done in an effort to
prevent the resurgence of an independent Poland. [Pef. 166]
Prior to 1948, it seems that the Communist Party largely
ignored the regular forces, concentrating on creating reli-
able internal security forces (KBW) . But after the consoli-
dation of power in 1948, they turned their efforts to the
political consolidation of the army. The ouster of Gomulka
on Stalin's orders was followed by a purge of many of the
Communists who had fought in Poland rather than in the
Soviet Union during the war, and who had assumed important
posts in the new army. With the outbreak of the Korean War,
Moscow initiated a massive buildup of its own military as
well as those of its satellite countries. As a result of
conscription in 19 49, the Polish army numbered nearly
400,000 men. The new Polish army was made to conform in
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every aspect to the Soviet model. And to ensure compliance-
with that directive, Soviet officers were reintroduced into
the army. Marshal Bokossowski , was named Defense Minister
and Commander-in-Chief and was directly responsible to the
Soviet High Command £Eef. 167]. The Polish Army was struc-
tured for mobile defense, but its actual offensive capabili-
ties were questionable at that time due to the poor state of
organization and inadequate armaments.
With Stalin's death several waves of demobilization were
initiated and defense spending was cut. In the middle of
these changes, the 1956 riots in Poznan occurred. The local
internal security forces proved unable to deal with the
demonstrations and regular army units refused to fire upon
the workers. An elite brigade from Warsaw used force to
restore order, causing hundreds of casualties. The national
outrage against both the KBW and the Party, who ordered the
use of force, resulted in command of the KBW Deing assumed
by General Komar, who had been purged along with Gomulka.
This change proved crucial in the October showdown with
the Soviet leadership. The Polish army was internally
divided between the Soviet generals and the lower-ranking
Polish officers sympathetic to Gomulka, which resulted in
its virtual neutralization during the crisis. Soviet
elements apparently did attempt to arrest Gomulka and his
supporters, but General Komar stopped them, and as
Bokossowski was ordered to move the Soviet troops toward
Warsaw, the KBW took up positions around the city to defend
it. Admiral Wisniewski, commander of the coastal defense
units, and General Frey-Bielecki, an Air Force unit
commander, also prepared their units for armed resistance
[Ref. 168]. This threat of resistance ultimately made
Khrushchev back down and accept Gomulka.
With Gomulka's return, there was a "renationalization"
of the army. National military uniforms and songs were
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reintroduced and many of the Soviet forms were discarded.
As part of the post-October agreement with the Soviets,
thousands of Soviet officers and advisors were replaced by-
Polish officers. Rokossowksi was dismissed from his mili-
tary duties (replaced by General Spychalski who had also
been among those purged with Gomalka) , dropped from his
government and Party functions, and sent back to the Soviet
Union. Poland also managed to obtain a status of forces
agreement giving Poland control (theoretically, at least)
over Soviet troop movements within Poland and the right to
try Soviet soldiers in Polish courts for off-duty crimes
[Ref- 169]. It also included a "noninterference in Polish
affairs" clause- [Eef- 170]
At the same time Party control of the armed forces was
weakened. The Communist youth organization was abolished,
ending mass Communist organization within the military. The
activity of political officers was reduced, and the company
level (lowest level) position of political officer was abol-
ished. Since only a minority of soldiers and about half the
officer corps were then subject to Party discipline, the
professional military leadership began to reassert itself.
2ven when it regained its Polish leadership, the armed
forces, which traditionally held high prestige among the
population, found itself considerably discredited, being
viewed as an instrument of a foreign power 8 £Ref- 171]
The 1960s saw a modernization of all WTO forces. Polish
ground force divisions were restructured to conform to the
Soviet model. The operational army has 15 divisions, organ-
ized into three military regions. Two of these divisions
are elite, special- purpose divisions: a sea-landing divi-
sion, reportedly designated for amphibious landings in
8 According to the RAND Corporation study, a public
opinion poll conducted during that time, the military had
fallen to 21st place as a desired profession, behind orfice
workers.
11 1
Denmark, and an airborne assault division. By 1969, the
armed forces had some 2,800 tanks (T-54s, T-55s) , and 750
combat aircraft including MiG-2 1s. ( See table IV)
Indications are that the nilitary modernization was a
source of considerable professional satisfaction among the
Polish military officers, and yet there is clear evidence
that considerable dissatisfaction existed also. Apparently
certain officers wished the modernization would proceed at a
faster pace. The fact that the Soviet army had new equip-
ment that did not get into the Eastern European armies for
years, if at all, and yet made it to Middle East clients was
a point of contention. [Ref. 172] This situation came to a
head in 1967 when some of the Polish military expressed
admiration for the Israeli victory and commented disparag-
ingly on the relatively poor showing made by the Soviet
equipment. Officers who openly expressed such opinions were
quickly ousted—some 14 generals and 200 colonels
[Ref. 173]. Still, in view of the fact that modernization
continues to lag substantially behind that of the Red Army,
one can speculate that a source of dissatisfaction still
exists.
After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the
Soviets made some change in the WTO structure which on the
surface gave the Eastern European countries more participa-
tion in the organization. They also continue! to increase
the level of integration and modernization, particularly of
the Northern Tier states. As table IV indicates, the size
of the Polish military forces increased some 66,000 over the
next 15 years. In 1971, as previously mentioned, there was
a significant upgrade in Northern Tier forces. In Poland
T-62 tanks were added to the inventory, along with Styx,
Scud, and Frog surface-to-surface (S5M) missiles, and
Snapper, Swatter, and Sagger antitank guided weapons (ATGW)
.
1975 saw the addition of SA-7 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles,
112
TABLE 17
Polish Military Force/Equipment 1964-1983






























































































Acft 745 700 705
same same same
Source:
The Military Balan ce , International Institute for Strategic
3nfudies,~London7 England.
and the SU-20 fighter-bomber (which no other WTO state has),
and in 1981, as Poland was experiencing the severe upheaval
and ultimately martial law, the T-72 tank was finally intro-
duced into the Polish and other East European armories. The
Poles also have in their inventory the SAO- 122, and a
variety of armored vehicles, including the BMP-1.
Taken separately, such a program of modernization might
seem to indicate a rather substantial confidence in the
Polish armed forces in spite of the problems in the country.
However, with the exception of the SO-20, the improvements
that were introduced into the Polish inventory were also
introduced into the armories of the GDE and Czechoslovakia.
It was to the Soviets 1 advantage to modernize northern tier
defenses, and therefore was not indicative of any special
degree of trust.
As with the other Northern Tier countries, another
aspect of the Polish armed forces that could suggest a
special degree of trust by the Soviets is the existence of
specialized units such as the sea-landing and airborne
assault divisions. Poland had a division of each as early
as 1967 and they were thoroughly integrated into the Soviet
plans to cut off the northern NATO flank. An airborne
brigade was introduced into Czechoslovakia only in 197 1 and
a parachute battalion (later upgraded to an airborne
battalion) in the GDE in 1975. These units are, as previous
stated, reportedly staffed exclusively by volunteers
[Ref. 174] # and thus would be carefully screened by the
Soviets in view of the highly sensitive missions they are to
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be assigned. The reliability of these units would obviously
be much higher than the reliability of the armed forces as a
whole, but because the numbers involved are limited, it
would not likely increase the overall reliability much, if
any
.
As a result of the purges in 1968, General Spychalski
resigned the post of Defense Minister and was replaced by
General Wojciech Jaruzelski. As mentioned at the beginning
of this section, he be^an to "throw away the rulebook," and
stress professional qualifications. The officer corps
became almost entirely "Polish." Only a handful of
Russian-Poles remain and Poles cf Jewish origin were elimi-
nated altogether. In 1972, 8 1% of all officers came from
peasant and worker families. Only 2% of them had had prewar
military experience, and Party membership of the officer
corps has increased to 85%, with all general officers being
Party members [Ref. 175]
From the 1970s to the present, there has been renewed
attention on postgraduate refresher training. Political
courses are considerably downplayed. Now new Polish offi-
cers pass through one of seven military schools, which are
degree-granting institutions in which the percentage of the
curriculum devoted to political studies has, as with post-
graduate studies, been reduced. Additionally, the current
officer promotion system places a premium on military skills
and less on the arbitrary application of political criteria.
Also a special career track f cr officers viewed early in
their careers as candidates for rapid advancement to mili-
tary leadership positions was established in the form of a
"Pool for the Faster Development of the Officer Cadre."
[Ref. 176]
The Party continues to stress the "ideological commit-
ment" of the officers, insisting that the "commander can
only speak in the language of the Party," but the more
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professional the officers become the less reliable they are
likely to become. To combat that tendency, the Party lead-
ership has increased material incentives for and attempted
to enhance the social prestige of the officer corps to
ensure its loyalty (as the GDE did). They have also renewed
emphasis on the importance of the political officer an an
instrument of control. [Hef. 177]
With the rise of the "military professional," the tradi-
tional problems the Soviets have had in implanting political
control in Poland, and the military takeover—even by a man
with such impeccable credentials as Jaruzeiski 9 — must raise
the abhorrent specter of a separate power center not
controlled by the Party. In view of the history of the
Polish armed forces, the Soviets have considerable cause to
doubt their reliability, no matter how entwined in the
Communist system they become.
D. POLAND IN THE WTO
The uprisings in Hungary and Poland considerably damaged
the structures of control with which Stalin had attempted to
bind the Eastern European countries to the Soviet Union, and
some attempt at assertion (albeit limited) of national
interests and sovereignty was seen during the late fifties
9 Born in 1923, Jaruzeiski fought as a junior officer in
the Soviet-sponsored Second Polish Army during World War II.
He joined the Communist Party in 1947, and later was
selected for advanced trainicg at the Higher Infantry
School, then to the General Staff Academy in Moscow, from
which he graduated with honors in 1955. A year later, at
the age of 33, he became the ycungest general in the Polish
army, and in 1957 was put in charge of the 12th Mechanized
Infantry Division. In 1960, he was selected— in an unusual
career appointment— to head the Main Political
Administration of the Polish Armed Forces. Two years later
he was nominated as deputy Minister of Defense, and in 1965
he took over as Chief of the General Staff. In 1968, he
became Minister of Defense- as noted earlier, a position
which he continues to hold today, along with that of First
Secretary. See Andrzej KorEonski, "The Dilemmas of
Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Poland: 19U5-1981,
l£3.§3 Forces and Soc iety, Vol 8, No. 1, Fall 1981, p. 6.
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and early sixties. In Poland there was a parallel
development of military doctrine at that time— one line
emphasizing coalition warfare and the other postulating
national defense and a separate Polish Front within the WTO.
As there were many Polish officers who were still
pro-Soviet, even after the removal of overt Soviet control
with the rise of Gomulka, they developed a coalition warfare
doctrine which assumed rapid offensive operations onto NATO
territory by WTO forces, stipulating that it was the mission
of the Polish forces to fight en this front. The central
tenet of this doctrine (which, incidentally, has not been
seriously questioned by Polish military, elite to this day)
is that national defense is not possible for a small
Communist state and that only in conjunction with the Soviet
Union and other WTO members can national security be guaran-
teed. The primary "threat" to Polish security comes from
NATO. Prior to the normalization of Poiish-FRG relations in
1970, the threat from the Bundeswehr was always highlighted.
[Eef. 178]
Another principal assumption of Polish coalition
doctrine is that war in Europe will be nuclear, granting
only the possibility of a short conventional phase. The
1970s saw a slight shift toward a longer conventional phase,
although the primary emphasis is still on nuclear conflict,
which would occur as the conventional phase escalated. This
basic assumption of nuclear conflict led to an emphasis on
the initial period of conflict, stressing such aspects as
preemptive attack based on surprise, deception, rapid offen-
sive operations and maneuverability. In accordance with
this coalition doctrine, the entire 15 ground force divi-
sions, the Air Force, and the Navy—not just some of their
units— are designated for the "external front"--f ighting
outside Poland to prevent NATO military operations from
occurring on its territory. [Eef. 179]
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Polish theorists have never claimed that this doctrine
was not originated by the Soviets, but they do claim to have
actively participated in its development, offering specific
tactical suggestions that have been accepted by the FTO.
Among these contributions are the operational tactics
involved in river crossings and battle control information
systems [Eef- 1803- Tne most important Polish contribution
to military doctrine is that of a separate Polish front,
developed by General Zygmunt Duszynski, head of the Chief
Inspectorate for Training. This idea would have designated
two Polish armies for the task of moving across the North
German Plain to the Low Countries with the third army occu-
pying Denmark. The Chief Inspectorate for Training would
serve as the peacetime nucleus of the front, having opera-
tional departments for this purpose. According to Ross
Johnson's interviews with former Polish officers, this is a
plausible explanation for the otherwise unusual prominence
of the Training Inspectorate within the Polish military
organization. It exists outside the General Staff and its
head (a deputy Defense Minister) has served as the WTO Joint
Armed Forces deputy Commander-in-Chief since 1969.
[Ref. 181]
According to former Polish officers, the idea of a
Polish Front was officially accepted by the Soviet Union in
a meeting of the WTO Military Council, and the idea appar-
ently served as the dominant scenario in the Soviet-Polish
command/staff exercises until the late 1960s [Eef. 182].
Whether the Soviets ever actually planned to implement such
a plan is open to speculation, in view of the questionable
reliability of the Polish forces. The existence of alter-
nate scenarios incorporating the Polish armies into various
Soviet fronts could certainly indicate their reservations
about the feasiblity of the Polish Front.
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During 1957 and 1958, Gomulka's foreign minister, Adam
Rapacki, proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in
Central Europe and limited withdrawals of foreign troops
from the two Germanies and Poland. If accepted, these
proposals could have resulted in the disengagement of Polish
troops from and Soviet plans for conducting nuclear war with
NATO troops, allowing the Poles to define their military
mission as exclusively the defense of Polish territory
[Ref. 183]. These proposals highlighted the development,
apparently on strictly Polish initiative of the "defense of
national territory" ( obrona terytorium kraju--OTK)
doctrine. There is no indication that this doctrine caused
the Soviets any problem because, apart from the fact that it
was a Polish initiative, its secondary purpose was to facil-
itate the movement of Soviet reserve forces and supplies
across Poland. [Ref. 184]
As was mentioned earlier, the Soviet control was seri-
ously shaken in 1956 as a result of the uprisings, and the
specter of national defense must have been extremely
alarming. By the mid 1960s the Soviets introduced the
system of joint exercises in the KTO to prevent Rumania and
Albania from deploying their national defense systems and to
keep other Eastern European countries from adopting similar
policies. [Ref. 185]
During the 1961-1979 period the Polish armed forces
participated in at least 25 ground forces/combined arms WTO
exercises, and probably more. Cf these 25, 7 were conducted
entirely in Poland— involving Russian, German, and
Czechoslovak forces; 7 were held completely outside of
Poland; and 11 were conducted jointly on the territory of
Poland and the GDR or Czechoslovakia. Of these 25 exer-
cises, commanders can be identified for 21; and of those 21,
6 had Polish commanders (Spychalski-two, Cho~ha-one, and
Jaruzelski-three) . Of the 15 foreign commanders, 10 were
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Soviet officers, 3 were German and 2 were Czechoslovakian.
[Bef. 186]
The Polish armed forces are completely integrated into
the WTO to the degree that all of their air defenses and
their entire navy would be controlled by a Soviet commander
in wartime and their entire ground forces are committed to
an "external" front. Also their armaments industry is crit-
ical in supplying certain military equipment for the WTO (as
will be discussed in the following section) . This would
seem to indicate a great leal of confidence in the Polish
military. However, in view of the Russian-Polish history,
this would seem to indicate exactly the opposite. That is,
the Poles must be so thoroughly integrated into the Soviet
system that they cannot organize opposition to Soviet plans
on their own initiative.
E. POLISH PARTICIPATION IN COMECON
While a look at the economic system of eacb WTO country
helps round out the reliability picture, it is particularly
important in the case of Poland- It has ostensibly been the
failure of the economy which has triggered all the unrest in
the last forty years, except in 1968.
Poland entered World War II as a predominantly agricul-
tural, overpopulated, and largely underfed country. It
suffered extensive damage during the war, but the worst of
the difficulties were under control by 1948, and prospects
were good for an ambitious Six Year Plan (1950-55) . Until
the outbreak of the Korean War, the level of production in
the armament industry was low. Only small arms, some
artillery, and the requisite ammunition were produced. As
Korea heated up, Stalin forced a massive arms buildup not
only in the Soviet Onion, but by his COMECON "allies" as
well. In the summer of 1950, a new "improved" Six Year Plan
120
was introduced in P eland on short notice. The military
buildup was unprecedented for its size and the pace of its
implementation. By the end of 1952, scarcely three years
later, the plan was fulfilled in every detail. The Polish
military industry employed 200,000 people. [Ref. 187] This
buildup obviously had serious negative effects on the
economy.
With such a disregard for consumer desires and because
living standards had deteriorated so drastically, the
workers in Poznan marched on Party Headquarters demanding
higher wages and a decent standard of living. These quickly
turned into riots which could only be controlled by the use
of force by the internal security police. These riots ulti-
mately brought Wladyslaw Gomulka out of arrest and into
power,
Gomulka tried to restore industrial productivity in
Poland by committing more inputs to production. Labor
rates, already high by international standards, were
increased, and wages were held down to find more resources
for investment. Again investment in agriculture suffered
greatly, but the defense budget consistently grew much more
rapidly than Poland's net material product [Ref. 188]. The
only "success" that Gomulka 's policies had was that infla-
tion was controlled by holding the growth of wages to around
10% of productivity growth. These policies caused such a
squeeze en consumption and decline in the standard of living
that the food price increases in December 1970 were the last
straw, and once again the population rioted.
Under the constraints of an ailing economy, Edward
Gierek tried to restructure Poland's participation in the
COMECON division of labor in weapons production. In the
1960s, Poland had produced the Polnocy-^lass landing
ships— 80% of which were exported to the Soviet Onion— and
undertook the modernization of the T-54 tank. In 1969 a
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COMECON decision to end the production of MiG fighter
aircraft in Poland had serious adverse economic conse-
quences- Gierek in 1971 arranged through COMECON that
Poland should begin to produce AN-28 transport aircraft,
which have both civilian and military uses, to try to take
some of the burden of defense expenditures (which in 1S70
was almost double the growth in the net material product)
[Ref. 189] off the civilian economy Nevertheless, during the
tea-year period from 1969-79, Poland seems to have borne a
disproportionate share of the costs of the COMECON weapons
policies, running a negative arms trade balance totaling
nearly $400 million (compared with Czechoslovakia's $2
billion surplus for the same period.) It was thus faced
with the burden of high military expenditures plus the
necessity to finance its net arms imports with a large
portion of its earnings from non-military exports.
[Ref. 190]
Edward Gierek' s solution to the Polish economic prcblems
was one adopted to various degrees by other East European
countries: accelerated imports of Western technology
financed by Western credits instead of making the needed
effective reforms--always anathema to Moscow. He counted on
the imports to upgrade the quality of Polish capital stock
and improve productivity. That it did not happen that way
was due to two miscalculations en the part of the planners.
One, Western technology, when used in conjunction with
Eastern labor without the usual Western market incentives
and labor discipline, proved less productive than in the
West. Two, within a year or two of the primary imports, the
planners discovered that Western technology also required
further imports of Western raw materials and semi-
manufactures which also had to be bought for hard currency.
The growing hard currency shortage made it difficult to
maintain the level of imports required for full utilization
of the imported technology. [Ref. 191]
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Gierek and the political leadership basically lost
control of the economy in 1976 when they backed down on the
increase in food prices to avoid the 1956-type riots. By
1979 Poland's debt to the West had reached over $20 billion
and the service on the debt 945? of the value of its exports
[Ref. 192]. In 1980 the deficit with the Wast declined
somewhat, but this was made up for by increases in raw
materials purchased from COMECON countries, particularly the
Soviet Union. For the first time in many years, the Poles
borrowed heavily from the Soviets. This increased their
deficit with the COMECON countries to $1.2 billion.
Within the framework of the division of labor in
COMECCN, Poland has been forced to produce goods, including
components for the arms industry, that required raw
materials and technology imported for hard currency. The
Soviet Union, however, has often repaid Poland in rubles at
prices that were not equivalent to the real dollar costs.
In 1982, the Soviets finally agreed to pay the Polish ship-
building industry and telephone industry 13.5 million and
1.2 million convertible rubles, respectively, to buy Western
components for Soviet ships and telephones. In 1983,
Poland's shipbuilding industry must have spent previously to
supply the Soviet Onion with ships for which Poland was
reimbursed in non-convertible rubles. [Ref. 193]
Additionally, because the Polish military industry is
less advanced than that of the Soviets, it mast price its
products lower for both COMECON and other customers. And to
top off those problems, Polish military industry, for ail
its high priority, is badly managed and inefficiently
supplied. A related difficulty (not applicable to Romania)
resulting from the paradox of Soviet policy is described by
Michael Checinski:
If the political situation in one of the COMECON coun-
tries becomes critical, the Soviets typically sponsor
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very costly joint military maneuvers and/or military
intervention. As a result, military spending increases,
and military industry expands its production— causing
more difficulties for the civilian economy throughout
COMECON. This vicious circle obliges each COMECON
member-state to pay a high pricey and this is particu-
larly true for Poland because ox its relatively large
army and armament industry. [Ref. 194]
Perhaps the most important constraint on the Polish
economy (and national autonomy) is the dominance of Soviet
strategy in Eastern Europe. COMECON defense planning,
including arms production and arms trade, is theoretically
integrated with national economic planning. In reality,
most defense planning is approved on the basis of "stra-
tegic" rather than financial estimates. Military supply
plans are outlined by the COMECON Military-Industrial
Commission in coordination with the WTO Command, which
cannot be changed without the approval of the Soviet Union.
The Soviets argue that this dominance is justified since
they bear 80% of the costs of the WTO defense efforts. What
they do not say is that the remaining 2055 is not eguaily
proportioned among the others and usually does not serve
their individual national interests. [Ref. 195]
With the declaration of martial law in Poland in 1981,
which resulted in the revocation of the U.S. Most Favored
Nation Status, the ongoing discussions with Western bankers
about the political unrest inside the country that almost
brought on another Soviet military intervention, the Polish
economy, for all practical purposes, ground to a halt.
Jaruzelski is publicly committed to systemic reform as a way
of restoring the economic health [Ref. 196]. He pushed
through legislation designed to make industry more efficient
by cutting inputs, reducing the role of the ministries in
the running of enterprises, and obliging managers to take
more responsibility. Tax and credit levers were supposed to
replace ministerial direction. New bankruptcy laws could
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make the most inefficient enterprises fold. And the private
sector, particularly agriculture and services, were to be
encouraged.
However, inflation is running over 20% a year and
production delays and bottlenecks are already congesting the
system. As long as resources for critical industries are
still centrally allocated, plans for worker self-management
and enterprise decentralization are stalled, and more
liberal laws governing joint venture operations remain
shelved, the new legislation will have very little effect on
the economy- [Hef. 197]
Basically, although the political situation has stabi-
lized for the time being and the economic systsm is holding
together, the economy is still extremely fragile. The real
reforms needed to put it on a healthy track are not likely
to be sanctioned by the Soviet Onion, and the demands by the
other COMECON countries will continue to increase, thereby
increasing bottlenecks and slowing down all COMECON econo-
mies. Therefore, the situation for the near future must be
viewed as one of "muddling through." Should a hard winter
or some other unforeseen catastrophe occur, the situation in
Poland could become chaotic again.
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?. CONCLUSIONS
From the previous presentation, it is obvious that the
Soviet (i.e. Russian) system of operation does not fit well
in any of the Northern Tier states, even though two of them
have populations of Slavic origins. It has, in fact,
stunted their development in many ways. The domestic polit-
ical situations are uneasy in each country. It would be
difficult to say that the Communist Party holds the alle-
giance of the people in any of the three countries. Even in
East Germany, the most loyal, the population is beginning to
openly protest the excessive militarization of their lives,
and continues to show a marked preference for things Western
rather than Russian. In Czechoslovakia the people are
cynical, "playing the game," since they have no other
choice; and in Poland the party faces periodic rebellion.
The economies have also suffered. 3eing forced to adopt
Soviet methods, standards, and priorities, as well as being
denied access to state-of-the-art Western technology, has
blunted their growth potential. Soviet priorities, forced
on the Northern Tier both through membership in COMECON and
the WTO, do not often coincide with the best interests of
the individual countries. Additionally, receiving Soviet
oil and natural gas subsidies may have kept them from imme-
diately feeling the effects of the 1973 Arab oil embargo,
but it ultimately affected their desire to conserve
resources and find alternative energy sources. It also made
them more politically dependent than ever on their major
energy supplier. Basically, therefore, one would have to
characterize overall Czechoslovak reliability as question-
able, that of the GDR as solid, for the moment, and that of
Poland as practically nonexistent.
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The Czechoslovaks are Slavs, but their traditions and
culture are decidedly Western. Their history of being the
crossroads of East and West has produced a marked preference
for negotiation and survival rather than fighting. They are
also a proud, intelligent, and literate people who have had
a tantalizing taste of successful democracy. Their profound
sense of betrayal by Western democracies (1938 and 1948) led
them to prefer a socialist system of development for their
country, but by 1968 it was clear that their definition of
socialism approached the pluralistic system they had set up
from 1918-1938, which was definitely unacceptable to the
Soviet Union. And in 1968 they were betrayed again—both by
the West and by the "motherland of socialism."
The Czechoslovaks are nothing if not pragmatic. They
cannot fight the power of the Soviet Union at the moment, so
they bide their time. The Husak regime has not succeeded in
infusing a sense of loyalty to itself or the Soviet Onion to
this day. After the Russian invasion, the people opted out
of politics and turned their attention to acquiring material
things. As long as the Husak government can keep the people
satisfied economically, they will generally ignore the
regime's slavish endorsement of the Soviet foreign policy
line and the lack of individual freedom.
In reference to the Czechoslovak military, it is
certainly well-eguipped (although not always with the state-
of-the-art equipment found in the Soviet inventory) and
well-trained, but there is a definite attitude problem which
would almost certainly affect how well it would fight in an
actual war with the West. The military has never completely
recovered from the stigma of not having defended their
country in 1968. It suffers from a lack of prestige among
their countrymen as well as frcm the knowledge that it has
little to say in the management of its own national affairs.
This state of affairs is certainly not conducive to whole-
hearted performance alongside the Russians.
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The Soviets are undoubtedly aware of these sentiments,
Loth in the military and in the civilian population. In
military affairs, as previously mentioned, the Soviets
curbed the independence of the Czechoslovak mission in case
of a war with NATO. While- it is still to be used in the
southwestern front, the army will now fight under direct
command of a Soviet officer and Soviet units will be alon-
side it. Indications are that the Soviets would prefer to
use them in rear echelon or non-critical positions.
Knowing the importance the Soviets place on "morale in
the rear," as Stalin phrased it, or the willingness of the
population to support the war, they must obviously be
concerned about the attitude of the civilian population.
They cannot help but be aware of the fact that discontent
continues to fester just below the surface. They will not,
however, most likely have to deal with the open rebellion
they face in Poland. What they might instead have to face
would be a case of bare compliance with their requirements
and no more—even sabotage that could not easily be traced
to a single person or plant, such as a slowing down of work
or "accidental" misplacement of some critical part for a
time, etc.
They might not actually be worried about open rebellion,
but since 1968, they have gradually strengthened the
National Security Corps— the equivalent of the dreaded
Polish ZOMO—to guard against that possibility. While the
Czech version does not evoke quite as fearful an image as
its Polish counterpart, its strength is about 11,000 troops,
or 7 brigades, it is equipped with armored fighting vehicles
and antitank weapons. The Soviets are directing the
upgrading and the professional education and training of
these troops. There are no indications that they are being
trained to accompany (or take the place of) regular army
troops; thus, as with other communist bloc countries, their
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purpose is to keep the people under control, rather than to
keep the enemy out.
The German Democratic Republic would have to be charac-
terized as the most reliable ally in the Northern Tier and
probably second only to Bulgaria in all of Eastern Europe.
That part of Germany which became the GDR retained the basic
characterics of the culture—conservatism, excessive defer-
ence to authority, resistance to change, and deep religious
faith.
While the Lutheran tradition runs counter to the commu-
nist ideals, the other characteristics—particularly submis-
sion to authority— fit in quite well with communist plans.
Germany was a fractured country after World War II, and
Stalin jumped at the chance to establish a firm foothold in
industrialized Central Europe. The leadership of the GDR
was quite aware of how dependent the country was on the
Soviet Union for its very existence and sought to ensure its
continuation by slavish imitation of the Soviet system and
foreign policy positions.
Integration into the Soviet-controlled socialist system
is evident in the GDR to a degree not found in any other
communist state. The SED leadership has used this integra-
tion to ensure continued Soviet commitment to the GDR, to
demonstrate its loyalty, and to consolidate its power inter-
nally. In fact, the GDR's frequent demonstrations of the
"defense readiness" of its military are another way of
saying to the Soviets that the country is worth defending
because it intends to make every effort to defend itself
[Ref. 198], in much the same way that many West Germans see
the Bundeswehr as the price for NAIO protection.
But with the signing of the Basic Treaty with the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1971, signs began to appear
that indicated that the Russian system did not fit as well
as the leadership of both countries would like. The
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resurging popularity of everything Western among the young--
music, movies, clothes, etc—as well as the growing pacifism
(evidenced by the size of the unofficial peace march in
1982) and such unusual occurrences as official reluctance to
have new Soviet missiles placed in Germany and the two-day
delay in following the Soviet lead to withdraw from the 1984
Olympics (in spite of an obviously previously coordinated
decision), indicate that there is not complete harmony
between the two governments. The most recent indication of
Soviet displeasure with increasingly independent East German
actions was the substantial pressure that was applied to
force Honecker to cancel his official visit to West Germany
in September of 1984. That would have been the first offi-
cial visit by the East German head of state to the FRG.
Obviously the Soviets are troubled by the increasing close-
ness of the two states. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable
future, the political reliability of the GDR is not in
question.
The East German military is without a doubt the number
two army (with respect to quality) in the WTO, second only
to the Soviets. While they might not have the most up-to-
date equipment, they certainly have the same as the other
Northern Tier states, and, more importantly, they have a
cooperative, even aggressive, attitude in military training
exercises. There is also no doubt that the NVA is highly
visible as a Soviet proxy in many parts of the world, work
that was previously handled by Czechoslovakia prior to 1968,
and which is only entrusted to "reliable" allies.
The question in the minds of many Western analysts of
whether East Germans would fight West Germans is addressed
below by a former NVA officer:
I believe that the hate cultivated (against the West and
the Bundeswehr) will bring results. I would warn you
against underestimating this problem. There will be
shooting; nobody in the NVA wculd say, 'Those people are
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Germans. 1 They will fight; I am totally convinced of
this. In terms of the purely military situation. when
the commander stands behind me, I have to shoot. In
terms of the psychological aspect of it, the soldier on
the other side is a soldier or the Bundeswehr. That is
of no interest to me at all. [Ref. 199]
Poland would obviously be classified as "unreliable. "
To repeat the earlier assessment of Polish culture, it is
individualistic, romantic, socially formal, extremely
nationalistic and patriotic. Catholic, and Western in
outlook. The Russian Byzantine mentality does not overlay
smoothly. The hundreds of years of enmity between the Poles
and the Russians have certainly not been improved by the
Communist domination of Poland since World War II. The
Poles continue to blame the Russians for almost everything
that is wrong with their country. And yet, by virtue
initially of their geographic position, and subsequently by
their participation in the WTO and COMECON, they are irrevo-
cably bound up with the Soviets.
Militarily, Poland has the largest army in Eastern
Europe. It is technologically modern and well trained. Most
of the officers are members of the Communist Party and could
be expected to have a considerable interest in maintaining
the status guo, since promotion to the highest levels of
command depends ultimately upon Soviet approval. Chances
are they have been coopted by the system. Nevertheless,
they are Poles. The enlisted force is technically profi-
cient, rote-trained, and used to maneuvering in a multina-
tional setting. But even more than the officers, they are
Poles. They are drawn directly from day-to-day life and are
only a part of the military for two to three years. They
reflect the socialization of the masses, and they generally
do not like Russians.
In a short war, with swift victories accruing to the
WTO, the key to reliability would be the officer corps and
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their ability to get the troops to obey them. For this
reason the Soviets spend so much time and effort in coopting
them. They do not have the economic capabilities to fight a
long war and are afraid of the defection of the troops in
that case. The elite units (airborne and sea-landing) can
be expected to be loyal, and possibly the rest of the offi-
cers fighting outside of Poland and against Germany could be
expected to perform well if they felt Poland had been in
danger of being invaded or attacked. The question would be,
could the Soviets convince them that the West was making or
had intended to make an attack? In view of the tendency to
assume the opposite of what is reported in the official
press, even in a situation of heightened tensions between
East and West, this seems unlikely.
As mentioned briefly at the beginning of this study,
there is one conceivable circumstance under which Poland
would fight as a relatively reliable ally of the Soviets:
that is, if they were subject to an unprovoked attack by the
West. Because of its geographical proximity to the Soviet
Union, Poland contains a large part of critical Soviet lines
of communication and resupply. According to Western war
plans, attacks would be carried out deep in the enemy's rear
in order to disrupt their communications and supplies. If,
by some chance, an attack was made on NATO by the Soviets
and other Pact forces in which Poland did not take part,
Poland could still expect a Western counterattack on its
territory because of the communications and supply points.
Under that circumstance, the West could certainly expect the
Poles to fight wholeheartedly to defend their country.
(However, that would not necessarily preclude some Polish
sabotage of Soviet positions or equipment.
)
Politically, the Communist Party has always been seen as
an alien government imposed on the Poles. With the history
of successful opposition to Party policies, under similar
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economic situations or even political ones, the people are
likely to keep up the fight against them. No matter which
way one analyzes the situation, it seems clear that under
almost any conceivable circumstance, within the next five
years or the next twenty years, the Poles will be the most
unreliable state within the Communist bloc.
Another ingredient that must be examined in this anal-
ysis is the fact that almost every country in the Eastern
bloc will face a leadership succession crisis soon, in addi-
tion to increasing economic difficulties. If a younger
generation of leaders arrives simultaneously, or nearly so,
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the situation could
become very tense. It remains to be seen whether the
younger generation in these countries will continue to
become coopted by the system as long as they have "things."
At some point in time, "things" usually lose their attrac-
tiveness if "freedom" is lacking.
While war with the West at that time would be unlikely
(as both sides would no doubt do all they couli to minimize
contact during such a crisis, as in 1968), a spillover
effect could occur if the Soviets were forced to invade and
the national armies resisted. If the ensuing conflict were
pushed over their borders into a Western country, problems
with NATO could occur. In that case, the reliability of the
Northern Tier would be practically zero, as they would not
have been attacked by the West, and would probably see a
chance to rid themselves of Soviet domination.
Obviously the primary Soviet concern under those circum-
stances would be to maintain control of its satellites. It
is possible that we could see mere military governments, in
spite of the Soviet aversion to having a separate power
center apart from the Party, or more Soviet invasions. The
problem with invasion, apart from receiving world condemna-
tion and the problems of explaining to the communist bloc
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why "fraternal brother states" are' fighting each other, is
that such occurrences could seriously strain an already
overburdened Soviet economy. That could ultimately produce
another occasion to challenge Communist control, although it
might not be immediately obvious because the Russian people
are more or less accustomed to the harsh economic sacrifices
demanded by their government. The situation could be doubly
dangerous if the Soviets were being challenged simultane-
ously in other parts of the world.
All indications are that the Soviets will sacrifice a
great deal to maintain control over their Eastern European
satellites, for the reasons mentioned at the beginning of
this analysis. One could reasonably expect the Soviets to
do everything possible in the near future to link the econo-
mies and militaries of the Northern Tier to each other and
to the Soviet Union in order to ensure dependence and
compliance with Soviet wishes. They are no doubt aware that
what was said of Poland earlier could also be true of all






June 30 to July 10, 1968
K = 3 9^
Source: The whole territory of the C.S.S.R.
Question: Would you prefer that Czechoslovakia re-
linquish the building of Communism and
enter the way of capitalist development,
or do you wish to continue building
socialism?
Percent
1. I prefer capitalist development -
2. I am for the continuation of socialist
development °9
3. I do not know, I have not thought about
it _6
100
N = number of resoondents.
Source: Jaroslav A. Piek.alkiewi.cz,
Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia, 1.968-69
Figure A. 1 Support for a Continued Socialist Society
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August 4-15, 196J
N = 2, 947
Source: Northern Czech-lands, Eastern Czech-lands, Southern
Moravia, and the city of Pragu
Question: What are the greatest guarantees ot socialist democ-
racy? Make three choices in order of importance.
Adult Accor ding to
population Dolitical affiliation
(18 and Members Nonrrembers
over) KSC KSC Aqrar ians
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Socialists
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Source: The whole territory of the C.S.S.R.
Question: Please identify those contemporary public





1. Dubcek 39.7 28.0 67.5
2. Smrkovskv 17.1 23. 1 2.7
3. Svoboda 12.5 14.9 6.8
4. Cisar 11.5 15.9 1.6
5. Husak 6.7 1.7 18.8
6. Sik 5.1 6.9 .5
7. Goldstucker 4.8 6.8 —
8. Hanzelka 1.8 2.5 —

























Source: Pieka lkiewicz, pp. 253, 262





-W.A. -10 -7.5 -5 -2.5 +2.5 +5 + 7.5 + 10
National total 5 — 1 14 5 29 9 41
Sex
Men 5 -- 1 11 5 29 9 43
Women 5 — 1 16 5 30 8 39
Size of place
Under 1,000 pop. 1 A 7 29 8 40
1,000-4,999 pop. 20 1 2 13 4 26 7 48












18-29 years 15 1 ] 13 6 29 9 40
30-39 years 5 — 1 12 6 32 9 39
40-49 years 5 — 1 14 4 27 10 42
50-59 years
60 years and over







445 — 1 17












staff/manager 15 1 1 10 7 32 10 40
Engineer 10 — — 2 10 7 28 14 37
Service worker 10 -- 2 14 5 34 7 37












1 c. 5 29 8 41
years schooling 5 — 1 12 5 31 9 41
University or
college 10 — 2 6 10 26 13 42
Party membership
Yes 10 — 2 11 2 27 9 4 9
No _ i; 6 30 9 38
Are you a member of a
local government council?
Yes 10 — 2 10 3 29 9 46
No 15 6 30 39
Source; Piekalkievicz, pp. 270, 271
Figure A. 4 Extent of DubceJc's Popularity
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